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From Cold War to Detente: Acheson, Dulles, Kissinger and their Perceptions of American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age

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FROM COLD WAR TO DETENTE: ACHESON, DULLES, KISSINGER AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

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Richard Lee Stevens

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

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compare and contrast the perceptions of three Secretarys of State--Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger--and how their perceptions were instrumental in determining foreign policy during the crucial period of the Cold War era.

The analysis takes place on three different levels. The first level considers the time period in which these three men have served as Secretary of State as the single most important element linking them for the purposes of this study. This is fundamental for the thirty years of the Nuclear Age and the subsequent development of the Cold War era separate this period from any other in recorded history.

The second level of analysis considers the perceptions of each man as he came to attain them both before and after becoming Secretary of State. In this way a composite sketch of each man's basic beliefs is obtained and then used in contrasting why each held to certain beliefs while discarding others.

In the third and final level of analysis, an attempt is made to show the relationship between these perceptions and the resultant foreign policies of these men as Secretary of State. It is suggested that there is a very definite and decisive relationship between the perceptions and the resultant foreign policies. The results of the study suggest that the foreign policies of these three men or any man who becomes Secretary of State, are largely a function of the perceptions and preconceptions which the man brings to the office.

PREFACE

> A process can be analyzed on the level of events and on the level of perceptions. The former analysis is an inquiry into what happened, the latter into how what happened was perceived or interpreted by specific individuals or groups. Analysis carried out in the natural sciences are usually confined to the level of events, and rightly so, if we are convinced that the events in the non-human world have an ultimate objective reality independent of our perceptions. Analysis of human affairs, however, cannot be confined to the level of events. In any process involving human affairs, perceptions and interpretations of events by human beings are themselves events, sometimes of prime importance to the process. Moreover, one cannot examine all events, and so must select from among those which, ultimately, will depend in large measure on one's own perceptions and interpretations. In order to be objective one must be aware of these perceptions and their sources in selecting the events to be described.[1]

Keeping the role of perceptions in mind, it is hoped that a comprehensive analysis of Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger, and their perceptions of the international environment, will illustrate how perceptions are related to the foreign policy-making process as it has been carried out since World War II during the era of the Cold War.

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[1]Anatol Rapoport, The Big Two: Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971), pp. 97-98.

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CHAPTER I

PERCEPTIONS AND IMAGES IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Before discussing the subject of any single man's perceptions and images in foreign policy decision-making, it is necessary to first qualify what constitutes a perception and an image; that is, to define the terms in relation to each other. Following this there will be an attempt to discuss the implications of these terms for the policy-making process; that is, an attempt will be made to determine how they originate, how they may develop or alter over a period of time, and finally, their relevance to the policy-making process. From such an analysis, it is hoped that a better understanding may be provided of the role perceptions and images have played, and continue to play, in the field of foreign policy-making and international relations.

The Distinction between a Perception and an Image

In making a choice among many courses of action or in response to a stimulus from the surrounding environment, a policy-maker's perceptions and images play an integral role. Man acts and reacts according to his images in general and his perceptions in particular. In policy-making, the state of the environment is secondary to what

a policy-maker perceives that state to be. A distinction is here made between a perception and an image because one is made up of the other. In this study an image is defined as

> . . . an individual's perceptions of an object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value, and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from, that object, fact, or condition.[2]

In other words, an image is distinct from a perception in that perceptions, as evaluations of an object, fact, or condition, go into making up the images of a person's overall belief system.

In turn, perceptions are made up of three other distinct components. The first is attitudes, which are defined as ". . . general evaluative propositions about some object, fact, or condition in terms of its being more or less friendly, desirable, dangerous, or hostile."[3] Every international relationship is carried on within an evaluative framework which assumes hostility or friendship, trust or distrust and fear or confidence toward another government. Attitudes, therefore, play an important role in how policy-makers react to actions, signals, and demands of other states, and how they perceive the intentions of other governments in defining their own objectives toward them.

The second is values, which are defined as: " . . . that

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[2]K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 360.

[3]Ibid., p. 362.

component of a perception which is the result of upbringing, political socialization in various group contexts, indoctrination, and personal experience."[4] Values stand as the yardstick against which one's own actions and those of others are judged. Values are the base upon which attitudes are built. For policy-makers, values serve as the reasons and justifications for goals, decisions, and actions.

The third is beliefs, which are defined as ". . . propositions that policy-makers hold to be true, even if they cannot be verified."[5] Beliefs such as those claiming that a particular economic or political system, nation, or ethnic group, is superior to any other, are developed in societies and expressed through the behavior of policy-makers. Such beliefs are important for they are intangibles which are often assumed or completely overlooked, but which are often the basis upon which many policy decisions are made. An example given by Holsti is Woodrow Wilson's belief that secret diplomacy, autocracy, and the balance of power caused war. Other examples include the predominant Western belief that communism inherently represents a military threat; President Eisenhower's belief that all political leaders were basically rational and peace could be secured through candid discussion; and the Chinese Communist

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[4]Ibid., p. 363.

[5]Ibid.

belief in the insatiable hostility of all "imperialists."[6]

In the end, these attitudes, values, and beliefs, go into making up perceptions which, over a period of time, become reinforced and solidify into a policy-maker's overall or cumulative images of the environment he is confronted with.

The Implications of Images on Foreign Policy

It is impossible for a policy-maker to know all of the relevant factors in a given situation. Consequently, his images of reality will always be different from reality. The discrepancy between image and reality can be attributed to several different factors. It is partly the result of physical impediments such as the lag time incorporated in the flow of information, faulty communications, censorship, or the incompetence of advisors and intelligence sources. Concurrently, reality becomes distorted as a result of attitudes, values, beliefs, or faulty expectations. In this process, an individual is constantly bombarded by messages from the surrounding environment, but he selects and interprets only a part of this information because only a part of it may be relevant to a particular situation. Additionally, the person may only interpret that information which conforms to his particular attitudes, values, and beliefs, or in other words, his perception of the

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[6]Ibid., p. 364.

situation. In the final analysis, there are physical and psychological factors which can influence, and even distort, the information upon which a policy-maker's images of reality are based. It is upon the psychological factors influencing policy-making that his study will concentrate.

In addition to the definition given, an image can be said to consist of the past experience of the possessor of such an image. These probably first appear as undifferentiated lights and noises or some other forms of stimuli. Over a period of time, the conscious image develops as a person perceives himself as an object within a world of objects. As a person grows the image of the world expands. He might begin by seeing himself as a member of a family, a town, a country, a planet, and so on. He also finds himself in an increasingly complex web of personal relationships. Every time a message reaches him his image is likely to be changed accordingly. Furthermore, as Boulding argues in his book, The Image,

> A distinction must be made, however, between the image and the messages that reach it. Messages consist of information in the sense that they are structured experiences. The meaning of a message is the change which it produces in the image.[7]

According to Boulding, when a message hits an image one of three things can happen. First of all, it may remain unaffected, as is the case in most instances. As Boulding states:

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[7]Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 7.

> We all receive messages all the time by way of our eyes and ears, but they are largely ignored. An example might be that of carpenters working on a building. If we know that a building is being built; hearing the noise does not add to the image. If the noise stops, though, it is immediately noticed and it changes the image of the universe for it probably means that it is quitting time for the carpenters.[8]

This is directly related to the second possible effect of a message on an image. It may change in some way by what Boulding describes as "simple addition." In illustrating this process Boulding states:

> Suppose someone looks at an atlas and finds out the exact relationship of Nyasaland to Tanganyika, where before he had only a vague image of the relationship. He will have added to his knowledge, or his image; he will not, however, have fundamentally revised it. He will still picture the world much as he had before. Something that was a little vague before is now simply clearer.[9]

There is, however, a third type of change which Boulding describes as a "revolutionary change." Sometimes a message hits some sort of nucleus or supporting structure in the image, and the whole thing changes in a radical way. An unusual instance of such a change is "conversion." Boulding illustrates this process by stating:

> A man, for instance, may think himself a pretty good person and then may hear a preacher who convinces him that, in fact, his life is worthless and shallow. The words of the preacher cause a radical reformulation of the man's image of himself in the world, and his behavior changes accordingly. The psychologist may say, of course, that these changes are smaller than

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[8] Ibid., p. 8.

[9] Ibid.

> they appear, that there is a great mass in the unconscious which does not change, and that the relatively small change in behavior, which so often follows intellectual conversion, is a testimony to this fact. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of reorganization of the image is an important one, and it occurs to all of us, although in ways that are much less spectacular than conversion.[10]

Such reorganizations are usually sudden and dramatic because an image is, in itself, resistant to change. Usually, when someone receives messages which conflict with a certain image, his first impulse is to reject them as untrue in some sense. Once again, as an illustration, Boulding states:

> Suppose, for instance, that somebody tells us something which is inconsistent with our picture of a certain person. Our first impulse is to reject the proffered information as false. As we continue to receive messages which contradict our image, however, we begin to have doubts, and then, one day, we receive a message which overthrows our previous image and we revise it completely.[11]

There may be, according to Boulding, a fourth impact of messages on an image. A perception has a certain dimension of certainty or uncertainty, probability or improbability, clarity or vagueness. A person's perception of the world is never uniformly certain, probable, or clear. Messages, therefore, may have the effect of not only adding to or reorganizing the image, but may also have the effect of clarifying it. That is to say, it could make something which was previously seen as less certain more certain, or something which was previously seen as vague, become clearer.

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[10] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[11] Ibid., p. 9.

But messages could also have the opposite effect. They can introduce doubt or uncertainty into an image. Illustrating this process Boulding states:

> If the noise of carpenters working on a building has stopped, but it is only four-thirty and it is thought they are supposed to stop at five o'clock, a certain amount of confusion is thrown into the mental image. For here is a message which contradicts an impression. What is one supposed to believe: There are two possible ways of integrating the message into the image. First, one can believe that he was mistaken in thinking that the carpenters stopped at five o'clock and that, in fact, their day ends at four-thirty. Or, one can believe that his watch is wrong. Resolution of the uncertainty is not possible, however, until there is an opportunity to compare one's own watch with another one or with some other source of time which is regarded as being more reliable.[12]

In the end, the important factor is that the impact of messages on the certainty of an image is of great importance in the interpretation of human behavior. Images of the future must be held with a degree of uncertainty because during the passage of time the messages that one receives inevitably modifies them. This means that as images approach the present they may change both as to content and certainty.

Images in International Affairs

To illustrate how international affairs are influenced by images let us consider one of the many incidents occurring prior to the Korean War which had an impact on events leading up to that conflict. One such incident of particular interest was a cable which arrived at the State Department in early June of 1950 from the

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[12] Ibid., p. 9.

American Ambassador to South Korea. The cable reported a heavy concentration of North Korean men and arms along the 38th parallel. Such information should have been perceived with alarm. But it was not. The reason was that the American Ambassador had been in Washington a short time before requesting additional arms for the South Korean Army in anticipation of just such an event. But instead of perceiving the message as a warning for a surprise attack, it was seen as just another argument for something somebody wanted. How can such an image be accounted for?

In accounting for this unfortunate image, based on a series of erroneous perceptions, de Rivera in his book, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, states:

> It is important to note that what is being discussed is what governs a perception rather than a decision. Although the event was perceived one way rather than another, there was no decision; the State Department was not aware that there were two conflicting ways of interpreting the event. It simply "saw" it one way.[13]

A perception, the component part of an image, according to de Rivera is always a "choice" or "guess" about the real nature of a message. Illustrating this phenomenon he states:

> If a person closes one eye and looks down a dark tunnel at a ball of reflected light, he may see either a large ball that is far away or a small ball that is close at hand. Either perception fits the pattern on the person's retina. Likewise, if the

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[13]Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 19-20.

> ball of light gradually increases in size the person may see either a growing ball or a ball that is moving towards him.[14]

Either one of these perceptions is valid in light of the date presented. It is important to note again that the person does not realize a choice is being made for he simply has a perception of a small ball close by or a large ball far away, a ball that is growing or a ball that is moving toward him.

Considering the large number of possible choices available to a person given this set of stimuli one might ask, what determines which of these possibilities becomes a person's "reality?" The best possible answer is what the person believes about related topics. By way of illustration de Rivera states:

> If a person believes the ball of light is reflected from a ping-pong ball he will see the light as close at hand; whereas if he believes the same light is coming from a billiard ball, he will see the light as farther away. The choice that is actualized is the choice that does not contradict one's other beliefs.[15]

In other words, the message or stimulus is filtered by the person to reinforce the image held by the person.

Applying this thinking to the State Department's image of the American Ambassador's cable one must consider the legitimate ways in which the information about a heavy troop buildup by the North Koreans could be interpreted as a stimulus. In the light of the State Department's response it is obvious that they saw the ambassador as

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[14] Ibid., p. 20.

[15] Ibid.

building a case for more money. This possibility was selected to become reality because of three ideas that were commonly believed in Washington at that time. These beliefs were that North Korea was a puppet governed by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would not have an atomic capability to offset American nuclear weapons until 1954, and, until it had this capability, the Soviet Union would not dare launch an attack. It is obvious that if the State Department had perceived the ambassador's cable an an indication of an attack by the North Koreans it would have conflicted with this system of beliefs. Therefore, the other possibility was perceived and solidified as the formal image.

In summary, it can be stated that an event that occurs as a stimulus can be legitimately perceived in a number of different ways. There may be no distortion in the stimulus but there may be perceptual error on the part of those trying to interpret the stimulus. For a person who sees an approaching light may, in actuality, be looking at a light whose brightness is increasing or the official who sees a mere request for money may actually be looking at a warning. Perceptual error can occur when one least expects it and without being aware of it because the truth will probably be unfamiliar and go against one's ideas.

Resistance to Changing a Belief

The writer will look ahead for a moment and consider this aspect of resistance to changing a belief in relation to the position of

Secretary of State, and in particular to John Foster Dulles. When Eisenhower took office he expressed a hope that a rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union might be initiated. He particularly wished to obtain an agreement on the control of nuclear arms. Considering the international environment at the beginning of his administration it appeared that the Iron Curtain was impervious to any serious negotiations. But by 1954, it appeared that a thaw had developed resulting from internal Russian changes due to Stalin's death in March of 1953 and the Russian realization of the destructive capacity of the newly developed thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet Union even had gone so far as to permit cultural exchanges, reduce the strength of its army, withdraw troops from Austria, agree to an Austrian Peace Treaty, and adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Finland. To many people, but not to Dulles, it appeared that the Russians were making legitimate strides at easing international tensions.

Dulles served as Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959 but had clearly developed his basic beliefs about the Soviet Union as early as 1950 when he wrote, "Soviet Communism starts with an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise."[16] According to Saville R. Davis, as quoted by de Rivera, in his article entitled "Recent Policy Making in the United States Government," the

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[16]Ibid., p. 24.

main conclusion Dulles drew from that premise was that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to keep its word. Davis noted:

> He had a deep suspicion of the Communists, abundantly justified by events. He believed that a nation operating by principles was at a disadvantage when dealing with an unprincipled nation, and feared that if we were drawn into agreements with the Kremlin on particular issues the effect on public opinion might be to undermine our ability to keep our guard. He was determined that we should not be taken in.[17]

As a result of this belief Dulles did not see arms control as his top priority. Instead, he gave top priority to solidifying the alliance of democratic nations against Communism, which had been undertaken long before any thaw, real or imagined, had appeared. If a decision had to be made between supporting arms control or alliance strength, Dulles invariably chose to support alliance strength. Following this policy was to lead eventually to the defeat of the arms control talks which Eisenhower so enthusiastically supported. According to Beckhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, the Russians were supposedly very much interested in the withdrawal of U.S. and Russian troops in Europe and in conventional disarmament.[18] Whether agreement could have been reached on the control of nuclear weapons and Arctic inspection points that interested the United States is doubtful. But even if agreement could have been reached on this issue, Dulles felt that an agreement on conventional

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Bernard C. Beckhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961).

disarmament in Europe would have led to an intensification of the split between East and West Germany. Dulles was not ready to abandon West Germany and upset its harmony with the United States in order to secure an agreement with the Soviet Union which he did not trust. Dulles felt so strongly about this issue that when a chief American negotiator gave his Soviet counterpart an informal preview of a control plan which had not yet been cleared by Germany, Dulles had him reprimanded, made him clear all subsequent moves through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and sent a deputy to assist him.

Dulles' belief that the Communist government was essentially evil resulted in an intransigent policy toward the Soviet Union. Given the appearance of the Soviet "thaw" that followed Stalin's death in 1953, should Dulles have changed his belief about the Soviet Union? For example, when Russia relinquished Austria Dulles might have been expected to perceive Soviet policy as becoming more friendly and to evaluate the Soviet Government as "good" instead of "bad." Alternatively, Dulles might have been expected to perceive the government as more evil if Soviet policy had toughened. In trying to determine if this was true, Holsti, in "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study" [Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962)], examined Dulles' statements during each of twelve six-month periods of time and related his perceived hostility or friendliness of the Soviet Union to Dulles' evaluation of them as good or bad. The results showed that there was no correlation. In other words, whether Soviet policy was hostile or friendly did not affect Dulles' basic beliefs

about the Soviet Union in any way.

In accounting for relative Soviet friendliness, Holsti's data showed that Dulles assumed Soviet capabilities had lessened. That is, Dulles perceived Soviet friendliness as meaning the Communists were weaker rather than nicer! As an example, Holsti explains that Dulles saw Soviet withdrawal from Austria as a failure of Soviet policy in Western Europe. By the same token, he saw the reduction of a million men by the Soviet armed forces as weaknesses in the Soviet industrial and agricultural programs. Whether these perceptions were correct is impossible to tell, but they do raise an important and interesting question. What could the Soviet Union have done to convince Dulles that they were indeed sincere about improving relations between the two countries? From the evidence presented by Holsti it appears that no matter what action the Russians took, Dulles would have interpreted the acts that should have led him to change his beliefs, in such a way as to preserve his existing beliefs.

Images Drawn from Distorted and Creative Perceptions

de Rivera defines a distorted perception as ". . . a perception that does not fit the objective structure of the stimulus. That is, given an image of a ball, we may see it as small and close, or larger and farther away for the stimulus has an objective structure that limits the number of possible legitimate interpretations."[19] He goes

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[19]de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, p. 44.

on to state, ". . . Such a perception is possible only when a person does not consider all of the relevant aspects of the stimulus."[20] Illustrating the phenomenon of a distorted perception de Rivera uses the simple stimulus given below:



He goes on to say,

> A person could organize or perceive this stimulus in various ways. He could see it as "three triangles," or "one triangle," or "face of a pyramid," or the "faces of three pyramids," et cetera. All of these perceptions fit the objective structure of the stimulus. Distorted or poor perceptions, such as "three spots," "two triangles," or a "figure," are not as accurate because the perceiver has not considered all of the relevant dimensions of the stimulus.[21]

As a result, a distorted perception or a series of distorted perceptions, follow a distorted image. A possible example of a distorted image is the account given previously concerning the State Department's image of the American Ambassador's request for more arms for South Korea because of the buildup of North Korean troops along the 38th parallel. Specifically, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs and other officials perceived the request as just another ploy to get something the Ambassador did not need. Again,

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

this image was based on the belief that Russia, which supposedly decided North Korean policy, was not prepared to openly engage in a confrontation which would almost certainly draw a military response from the United States. The image was able to manifest itself because the American officials in the State Department failed to consider the cable of the American Ambassador to Korea, who clearly warned about the possibility of North Korean encroachment over the 38th parallel into South Korea.

The process is the same when dealing with creative perceptions. In defining a creative perception de Rivera states:

> Some perceptions are deeper in that they capture more of the essence of the structure than a cursory inspection reveals. Thus in the above figure, "four triangles" captures more of the stimulus. The importance of the accuracy of a perception can hardly be overstressed: as stimuli increase in complexity, fewer perceptions seem to capture their essential structure and creative insight becomes important. Indeed, one can view creativity as perception based on attention to the structure of a complex stimulus. This is what Michelangelo was referring to when he said that he did not create a statue but simply freed its form from the rock. A great musician is confronted with the same page of notes as his students, yet his music reflects a different perception of these notes. Thus, Pablo Casals instructs his students to try to see behind the notes into the structure they reflect. This is not to say that there is only one correct interpretation of a set of notes--rather another great cellist would play them differently. But both great interpretations reflect a structure which lesser interpretations miss.[22]

And so it is with Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger. One thing that is most interesting about this process is that any interpretation reflects the person who renders that interpretation. In other words,

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[22]Ibid., pp. 44-45.

an image is creative not only because it is based on the structure of the stimulus, but also because it is based on the structure of the personality of the creator. In order to understand the structure of some external factor one must eventually look to the structure of the inner person who created that factor. This seems to be most apparent in the arts, but it seems to be true in all fields. Certainly, it is just as important for a man, such as the Secretary of State, to have his images fit the structure of reality, as it is for any other person. In fact, it is probably more important for, while a Secretary's images do not necessarily have to be creative, they cannot be distorted to a great degree because the results of actions precipitated by such images can have consequences affecting millions of people if they are too far removed from reality.

In summary, then, there are two distinct processes which determine how reality is to be constructed by a person. The first is an attentive process which determines what is selected as the stimulus. The second is a perceptual process which determines which of the various alternative views of the stimulus is actually perceived. The attentive process depends primarily on the responses which the person has learned from past experiences and on the person's goals and beliefs. The alternative which is then selected as an image will be the alternative that requires a minimal reorganization of a person's basic beliefs. The interaction of these two processes, then, determines what image a person develops and how well this image fits the actual stimuli which he must utilize if he is to achieve his purposes.

These are just some of the many elements which go into making up an image. The preceding discussion has been an introduction in order to familiarize the reader with what the writer considers to be the crucial element in the foreign policy-making process. The following chapters will discuss in detail some of the elements discussed here along with others. In this way it is hoped that an illustration may be provided of the importance of images in politics in general, and international politics in particular.

CHAPTER II

ACHESON: PRESENT AT THE CREATION

Dean Acheson was the principal author and manager of American foreign policy during the presidency of Harry S. Truman. Acheson began his tutelage for the position of Secretary of State as Under Secretary of State from August 1945 to June 1947. He helped to provide an intellectual balance during the unstable transition between the war against the Axis Powers and the Cold War against the Communist Empire. Acheson became Secretary of State in January 1949 and served until January 1953. During this time he, more than any other man, suggested the courses of American foreign policy. Few other four-year periods in the history of American foreign relations are as crowded with significant events as the Secretaryship of Dean Acheson. Acheson himself later proclaimed that he had been "present at the creation,"[23] that is to say, the creation of American foreign policy to deal with the new era of the Cold War.

While Acheson was Secretary of State, the United States negotiated and ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, continued to finance the reconstruction and began the rearmament of Western Europe,

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[23]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969).

encouraged the formation of the West German government and its integration into a system of European defense against the Soviet Union, accelerated the development of thermonuclear weapons, watched unhappily as the Chinese Communists won control of mainland China, fought a costly war in Korea while still advocating Europe as the primary area of concern for American security, supported the French colonial war in Indochina, sought to mediate between declining British power and the burgeoning nationalism in the Middle East, endured unsubstantiated accusations of treason; while at all times fencing warily with Moscow, certain that the nation's security lay in the creation of positions of strength against the Soviet Union and the expanding Communist Empire. Indeed, none could deny that these policies and others, formed under Acheson's direction, continued to influence the international behavior of the United States for the next two decades.

In this chapter an attempt will be made to show the development of Acheson's perceptions prior to and during his tenure as Secretary of State. Specifically, the attempt will be made to identify his perceptions of the international environment and the relationship between these perceptions and his policies, which is to say, the content and tone of American participation in the Cold War. The analysis will consist of examining certain events and elements which contributed to the development of his perceptions of the international environment. Some of the more important elements which will be addressed are: his general perceptions concerning the role of the United States in world affairs, his perceptions about the character of

the international system, the role of morality in international relations, the role of power in international relations, and how these perceptions were then translated into action.

Early Influences in the Development of a World View

The writer does not intend to dwell here on Acheson's early life before entering government service, for the most significant perceptions are those which he developed during his public service. However, it is quite obvious that there were two influences in his early life which he carried with him throughout his life in and out of public office. One of these influences was his father, The Reverend Edward Acheson. The Reverend Mr. Acheson remained aloof from the day-to-day activities of child raising, devoting himself to his congregation and his faith. But he did provide himself as a vivid guide and teacher to his children during summers in the Maine woods. It was Acheson himself who paid tribute to the influence of his father:

> As a prelate he was a baffling man, widely read in theology and Christian doctrine, yet rarely speaking of either, privately or in his sermons, which so far as I can remember dealt more with ethics and conduct. But no conviction could have been deeper than his code of conduct, based on perceptions of what was decent and civilized for man inextricably caught up in social relationships. If his goal was the salvation of the soul, it was a salvation by works performed with charity and humor as well as zeal. Through his mixture of belief ran a strong strain of stoicism. Much in life could not be affected or mitigated, and, hence, must be borne. Borne without complaint, because complaints were a bore and nuisance to others and undermined the serenity essential to

endurance.[24]

This eventually became Acheson's own code. As Secretary of State, Acheson, like his father, showed an aversion to philosophical abstractions. He preferred a foreign policy based on specific achievable goals and disregarded inspirational generalizations such as those advanced by the "world federalists." Like his father, who had grown up in the middle class life of England, Canada, and the eastern United States in the late Victorian era, he developed his perception of what was "decent and civilized." He came to measure other men and nations by that perception. Most of all, he was a stoic who did not complain or pity himself for things he could not change.

Years later, after he had graduated from Yale law school, Acheson was to undergo another significant influence which served to solidify his existing beliefs. In spring of 1919, Acheson became the law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis. In a letter about Brandeis written by Acheson in 1920 he discusses the very attributes he would later adopt as Secretary.

> On the emotional side he has, of course, human sympathy. But I don't think the Justice puts the slightest faith in mass salvation through universal Plumb Plans. People haven't the intelligence for that sort of thing. They have only the intelligence to operate in small personal groups which deal with things with which they are immediately acquainted.[25]

As with his father, Acheson was describing attributes which he himself

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[24]Dean Acheson, Morning and Noon (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 18.

[25]Ibid., p. 78.

would later adopt as Secretary of State. He was describing a man who was skeptical of panaceas or utopias; a man who was suspicious of those who sought to achieve too much too fast, believing that it was only possible to win limited victories in the complex international system.

The Role of the United States in World Affairs

The perceptions ultimately held by Acheson were developed by way of influences like those mentioned previously. The degree to which they influenced him is impossible to determine, and for that matter is not relevant. The important fact is that the view of society around which Acheson built his world view began at an early stage in his life. This development led to a culmination of many of Acheson's thoughts by 1939, a decade before he became Secretary of State. It was in 1939, that new fissures began to appear in the superstructure of the international environment. In September of 1939, war had begun in Europe as it had in 1931 in China with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Acheson saw the stable world he had been born into crumbling under the blows of World War I and the war that was just beginning. Even at this early point in the conflict, however, he never doubted that the United States should fully support those fighting the totalitarian powers. At this time he was a lawyer in private practice with the firm Covington & Burling, although he was serving as an "advisor and representative" at the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of his close friend

Felix Frankfurter. Soon after these hearings he was offered the post of Judge of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia by President Roosevelt. But he declined such "sedentary confinement" at the age of forty-five and became the chairman of the Attorney General's committee on Administrative Procedure. Although he was only on the periphery of public office he leaped into the great public debate over American intervention, contributing his name, voice, pen, and ideas. The years 1939 and 1940 were when Acheson elaborated his perception of America's role in world politics. Of his speeches, two in particular illustrate his beliefs at this time; one was given at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, in November 1939 and the other before the annual convention of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in New York in June 1940. A decade later, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on his nomination as Secretary of State, both speeches were quoted at length as the basis of his fundamental thought.

In his Yale speech, Acheson described the nineteenth century as having been a period when a stable world order existed. He described it as a time when there were great areas of free trade, a great center of finance in London, the British navy guaranteed ". . . security of life and investment in distant parts of the world," and immigration to the United States provided ". . . a solution for surplus populations elsewhere." Acheson then outlined the decay of the nineteenth-century system and the subsequent ". . . appearance of the totalitarian military state." To Acheson the United States had a

responsibility to prepare itself militarily to meet such developments. ". . . I think it clear that with a nation as with a boxer, one of the greatest assurances of safety is to add reach to power." He called for action and condemned the type of soul-searching which so often afflicted the American public when it came to entering a conflict. "We should stop analyzing ourselves--stop Gallup polling ourselves and start analyzing the needs of our situation and the potentialities of our power. . . ." Acheson's foresight at this time seems extraordinary considering the measures he called for and what, in fact, was adopted. Looking to the postwar world, for instance, his calls for a "stable international monetary system," and removal of ". . . exclusive or preferential trade arrangements with other areas created by military or financial conquest, agreement, or political connection . . . ," were those policies adopted in the mid-1940s.[26]

In June 1940, six months later, only a week after Dunkirk, Acheson spoke to the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. Once again he warned against doubt and questioning in a time of crisis. He stated:

> All that the enemy asks is the smallest shadow of irresolution and doubt upon which to work, the slightest suspicion of those with whom we must stand shoulder to shoulder, in order to foment discord and confusion. . . . Here we cannot afford to say magnanimously that reasonable men may differ. We are faced with elemental, immoral and ruthless power. In dealing with it, we can be wrong only once. Remember, I beseech you, that the judgment of

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[26]Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), pp. 13-14. [Vol. 16.]

nature upon error is death.[27]

Acheson did not delude himself into thinking the United States could avoid war.

The prescription that Acheson put forward in 1939-1940 was advanced in the hopes that a nearly ideal world system, like that which existed in the nineteenth century, might be rebuilt. Such a system would see the Pax Britannica replaced by a Pax Anglo-Americana. Such a world would implicitly benefit the decent, civilized middle class of Acheson's own experience who believed in democracy, stability, and the rule of law. Acheson paid little attention to the underdeveloped countries of the world because he assumed that if the Atlantic world was secure and prosperous, there would be no serious problems in those countries dependent on the developed industrial nations. His basic perceptions about non-European and American status in the world did not shift much over the next ten years.

General and Specific Perceptions of International Affairs

Acheson based his perception of international relations on the phenomenon of struggle. He believed the relations among states to be in a constant state of flux. Even relations between only two countries effected those of every other country to some degree. According to Acheson, nations are ". . . bound together in a form of restless life in which forces are constantly moving, changing, in search of balanced

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[27]Ibid., pp. 14-15.

and maintained pressure . . . the relations of nation-states are not episodic and isolated; they are continuous and interrelated."[28] The perpetual struggle among nations involves a constant effort to maintain an equilibrium so that no one nation-state becomes so powerful that it can impress its system of beliefs upon other nation-states. Although absolute or permanent agreements, whether in the form of alliances or supranational institutions, are never foolproof, hard work, diplomatic skills, and man's creative intelligence, can help in avoiding violent eruptions in the international system. The foreign policy of a powerful country like the United States can be evaluated by how well it is able to influence and adjust to the various pushes and counterpushes in the international arena. Basing his perception of international relations in the context of a worldwide struggle led him to make policy recommendations reflecting this belief.

Primary among his beliefs was that the nation-state would continue to be the primary actor in the international arena. To Acheson, national self-interest took precedence in the settlement of disputes between any two states or group of states. He felt that man was only deceiving himself when he spoke of world peace through world law for no world community really existed. Concerning this issue he wrote in 1957:

> It will not do to say that the United Nations will determine policy, make decisions, and enforce them. The United Nations is

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[28]Dean Acheson, A Democrat Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955), pp. 88-89.

> not a supranational entity with a mind, a will, and power. It is a forum, and no more than the nations that meet there. Nothing more comes out of it than is put into it. . . .
>
> If a great nation, like the United States, looks to the United Nations to form American policy, instead of fighting in the United Nations for what the American Government believes should be done, then we have committed an unprecedented abdication of responsibility and power. . . .[29]

In making policy, Acheson emphasized the need for American policymakers to view the world without illusions. He stated that the American people and American statesmen must realize that

> . . . the first duty of a society is to survive. It isn't to make the world safe for democracy, or to bring about the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. It is to survive. That is the No. 1 necessity.[30]

American policymakers had to understand the true nature, dimensions, and immediacy of the problems which confronted the United States in world affairs. And it was only by pursuing short-range and achievable goals that the immediate challenges of today could be met. According to Acheson's perceptual framework, there were no absolutes or sure things in the vast, complex realms of foreign affairs or human relations.

Concurrent with his feelings of viewing the world free from illusions was Acheson's rejection of basing foreign policy on morality. According to Acheson, morality in domestic affairs could not be transferred in attempting to construct an international moral system. On

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[29]Dean Acheson, "Danger in the World--and What to Do About It," U.S. News & World Report 48, June 13, 1960, p. 119.

[30]Dean Acheson, "Foreign Policy Tradition of the United States," Vital Speeches 13, July 1, 1947, p. 551.

morality in international affairs he stated:

> Morality is a very slippery word in international affairs. . . . Morality in domestic affairs is something one can understand because there one is living under a system which has enforcement agencies and agencies for formulating doctrines and enforcing them. In the world, it may be that that does not exist. . . . You are dealing with people, one half of whom deny the very foundations of what you call morality. . . .[31]

Taking his belief one step further, he also felt that it was erroneous to regard nations as individuals, and then to apply the same code of conduct for individuals to the conduct of nation-states. Considering this issue he stated:

> The fact is that nations are not individuals; the cause and effect of their actions are not individuals; the cause and effect of their actions are wholly different; and what a government can and should do with resources which it takes from its citizens must be governed by wholly different considerations from those which properly determine an individual's use of his own . . . .
>
> This does not mean that considerations of compassion have no place in governmental decisions. It does mean that the criteria are generally quite different and far more complicated. . . .[32]

Another crucial element making up Acheson's perceptual framework was that of power and its distribution throughout the international environment. Acheson believed that power could only be limited by countervailing power. Following this reasoning he believed it was the duty of the United States, as the strongest nation, to assume leadership of the free world in countering the thrusts of the Soviet Union. Acheson did not limit this to simple military force.

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[31]Dean Acheson, "I Don't Share the Sense of Panic," U.S. News & World Report 42, January 18, 1957, pp. 129-30.

[32]Dean Acheson, "Middle East Policy," Vital Speeches 23, February 1, 1957, p. 236.

Power, to Acheson, came from a combination of elements: production rates, natural resources, technology, plant facilities, population, and the intangibles of will and determination. It was, therefore, important for American foreign policy to fully develop and utilize a power foundation integrating its financial, political, economic, and military components.

This is not to say that Acheson did not consider military force to be important. In fact, he maintained that it was a major and necessary element of international relations. He felt it an undeniable fact that force or its threatened use should play a substantial role in the overall strategy of creating a viable foreign policy. He saw deterrence strategy as an indispensable element for stopping the military expansion of communist states like Russia and Communist China. Such a strategy should be flexible, able to operate at all levels of intensity, and match the amount of force to the objective desired. Acheson believed it folly to renounce the use of military force in international affairs in light of the realities of the system. On this issue he wrote:

> It is moral to deny ourselves the use of force in all circumstances, when our adversaries employ it, under handy excuses, whenever it seems useful to tip the scales of power against every value we think of as moral and as making life worth living?
>
> It seems to me not only a bad bargain, but a stupid one. For the very conception of morality seems to me to involve a duty to preserve values outside the contour of our skins, and at the expense of foregoing much that is desired and pleasant,

including--it may be--our own fortunes and lives.[33]

In the final analysis, Acheson felt that the military capacity of a country should be intended to avoid a nuclear war or acts which might lead to such a war as its first contingency. If such a war could be successfully avoided over a period of time, then perhaps, countries like the United States and the Soviet Union might be able to reach agreement on issues the two nations share with mutual interest. Such an issue would be the prevention of an accidental nuclear war and nuclear proliferation.

Solving the problems of international relations required more than simply avoiding a nuclear holocaust, however. To Acheson, working in the international arena was a dynamic process; as one problem was solved another appeared to take its place. This meant that a foreign policy could not become rigid, trying to fit situations into a pre-conceived pattern. Because of the unstable nature of the world, arrangements with other nations, be they friend or foe, could not be allowed to become static. Acheson prescribed three steps policy-makers should take in order to avoid such errors in policy. He stated that foreign policy-makers must make a conscious effort:

> . . . 1) to overcome their predilection to rely on policies which were successful in the past.
> 2) to avoid indecision and thus forestall the danger that outside pressures will in fact determine foreign policy.

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[33]Dean Acheson, "Ethics in International Relations Today," Vital Speeches 31, February 1, 1965, p. 228.

> 3) to create a strategic framework which allows for the flexibility needed to adjust to changing situations and changing power relationships.[34]

Another crucial element in the development of a successful foreign policy, according to Acheson, was a nation's domestic affairs. He believed that foreign and domestic policy were inextricably linked to the point that foreign policy was only as successful as a nation's domestic policy. Unless a nation's domestic institutions were viable and progressive it could not hope to provide viable and progressive institutions in the international arena. Creating this successful domestic situation meant educating Americans to understand that their attitudes toward other nations helped decide international issues, that their political struggles influenced world events, and that the solidarity of their economy was inextricably intertwined with that of the international economy. Most of all, perhaps, the success of American foreign policy depended

> . . . on the unusual leader who has the rare combination of qualities which are needed for successful leadership in a democracy, not only courage and common sense, but that blending of persuasiveness and willingness which can make the unpalatable acceptable.[35]

All of the elements discussed up to this point were considered by Acheson as crucial for carrying out a successful foreign policy.

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[34]Ronald J. Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson (Miami, Florida: Miami University; Odyssey Press, 1969), pp. 56-57.

[35]Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 27-28.

One element that he did not consider crucial to American interests in foreign affairs was that of the underdeveloped nations. He considered these areas as only of peripheral concern to the United States. For Acheson, it was the crucial area of Western Europe where the survival of the free world lay. According to Stupak, there were four considerations which, Acheson believed, should guide American policy toward the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America:

> . . . 1. Unlike contemporary movements, the American Revolution was a political act and not a social revolution. Therefore, the United States should refrain from active participation in the internal affairs of the emerging nations . . . .
>
> 2. Freedom and democracy require that a certain level of national economic productivity exist within a state, . . . [t]herefore, . . . foreign aid should be concentrated in those states where American [aid] . . . carries promise that democratic systems will be established.
>
> 3. The revolutionary nationalism of the new nations inevitably sets up new . . . power [relations]. . . . [T]he United States [should] see that his adjustment occurs . . . [peacefully] . . . to avoid the chaos which is so profitable to Communism. But as the United States works against military aggression and economic disarray, it must, on the other hand, never oppose change itself. . . .
>
> 4. National self-interest must be a major American guideline in its relations with the emerging nations. The United States, should not be swept away by humanitarian sentiments. . . . [I]t should aid specific nations for specific purposes within the capacity of its resources. . . .[36]

In summary, then, it can be stated that Acheson's views on international relations were both optimistic and pessimistic. Acheson's pessimism stemmed from his rejection of the idea of a supranational government based on universal law ever becoming a reality. His optimism stemmed from his conviction that man could resist the

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[36]Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson, pp. 60-61.

tyranny of Communism by using his creative intelligence. But in the end, he realized that whatever gains were made in the international arena required hard work on specific achievable goals and utilization of a realistic diplomacy in order to protect the world from a nuclear holocaust until some time in the future when broader negotiations might be undertaken.

Perceptions Translated into Plans for Action

"We are faced with a challenge and a threat to the very basis of our civilization and to the very safety of the free world, the only kind of world in which that civilization can exist. . . ."[37] American foreign policy, like any foreign policy, is a seamless web. No one place is the perfect starting point, and no one problem can be distinguished from any other as being more crucial. But, on the basis of the four years Acheson spent as Secretary of State, the one overriding issue which permeated every other was the Soviet and Communist Challenge. Soon after becoming Secretary of State, Acheson stated its importance when he said, "The main obstacle to peace is easy to identify, and there should be no mistake about it. That obstacle has been created by the policies of the Soviet Government."[38] He described the threat as a ". . . fanatical doctrine which dominates one of the great

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[37]Bulletin XXII, April 22, 1950:674 [address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors].

[38]Bulletin XXIII, September 20, 1950:523 [address to the General Assembly of the United Nations].

states in the world, a state which, with its satellites, controls the lives of hundreds of millions of people, and which today possesses the largest military establishment in existence. . . ."[39] On another occasion he said,

> The hostility of Soviet intentions, if taken alone, would not produce so grave a threat. But the combination of these intentions and Soviet military power creates very grave danger to the survival of free nations and free institutions, a danger which must not be underestimated. . . .[40]

According to Acheson, there were six specific barriers to peace which the Soviet Union posed during his tenure as Secretary of State:

First, Soviet efforts to bring about the collapse of the non-Soviet world, made genuine negotiation very difficult.

Second, the shroud of secrecy which the Soviet leaders have wrapped around the people and states they control was a great barrier to peace.

Third, the rate at which the Soviet Union had been building arms and armies, far beyond any requirement of defense, gravely endangered peace throughout the world. The Soviet Union had forced countries to rearm for their self-defense.

Fourth, the use by Soviet leaders of the international Communist movement for direct and indirect aggression was a great source of trouble in the world.

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[39] Bulletin XXII, April 22, 1950:674.

[40] Bulletin XXIII, November 29, 1950:964 [address to National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States].

Fifth, the Soviet use of violence, often camouflaged as civil war, to impose its will and its political system upon other people was a threat to the peace.

Sixth, those who hold and practice Communism pick the United States as the principal target of their attack. From their point of view they pick it rightly. It is this nation with its belief in freedom and tolerance, its great productive power, its tremendous vitality, which stands between the Kremlin and dominion over the entire world.[41]

It is both interesting and important to note Acheson's analysis of what he perceived as an adversary relationship between the Soviet Union and the free world, in the larger context, and the Soviet Union and the United States in a narrower one. The implications for American foreign policy were great. For he did not see the Soviet threat as being potential. He believed it was a kinetic and active force and did not feel that if the United States ignored it or became more amenable to the Soviet position, conflict could be avoided. He felt and stated that the Soviet Union's efforts to dominate the world by way of communist doctrine and "wars of liberation," posed the greatest threat to the United States and the peace of the world. To him it was a life-and-death struggle which the United States, on behalf of the free world, would have to direct

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[41]Bulletin XXIII, September 20, 1950:524 [address to the United Nations General Assembly].

as much as possible. It was the United States which had the most to gain or lose in the ensuing confrontation. It was with this perception in mind that Acheson tried to develop a foreign policy that would effectively deal with the Communist threat. It was around this perception that American foreign policy under Acheson revolved.

Putting Plan into Action

In 1950, Acheson stated, "The times call for a total diplomacy equal to the task of defense against Soviet expansion and to the task of building the kind of world in which our way of life can flourish. . . ."[42] Acheson's response to the Soviet challenge varied from time to time and place to place, but the basic outline of his policy toward the Soviet Union remained the same. He stated it clearly in 1950.

> What course of action will enable us to maintain our freedom and bring about a peaceful resolution of the world crisis; or, if despite our best efforts aggression does not take place, will provide a basis for defeating it? . . . The course of action we have chosen is to join with our allies in building the strength of the free world as a bulwark against Soviet aggression. This involves building military strength, but it requires no less the buttressing of all other forms of power--economic, political, social and moral--and the utmost resolution and unity among the free nations of the world.[43]

In adopting this line of action, Acheson rejected three others. First there was no answer in isolation, in a ". . . vain

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[42]Bulletin XXII, March 16, 1950:478 [address at the University of California, Berkeley, California].

[43]Bulletin XXIII, November 29, 1950:964-65 [address to the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States].

attempt to remain an island of security in a Soviet-dominated world."[44]

Second, there was no answer in appeasement which was simply another form of isolation.[45] ". . . We are always ready to discuss, to negotiate, to agree, but we are understandably loath to play the role of international sucker. . . . We want peace, but not at any price."[46]

Third, there must be no preventive war.

> All responsible men must agree that such a course is unthinkable for us. It would violate every moral principle of our people. Such a war would necessarily be incredibly destructive. It would not solve problems, it would multiply them. . . ."

Furthermore, he rejected the notion that war is inevitable.[47]

Clearly and repeatedly, Acheson repudiated the tenets of isolationism, appeasement, and preventive war. As an alternative, Acheson put forward and argued for a different line of action. The policy can be basically summarized in the following propositions: Resist communism, and build "situations of strength"; work for an eventual settlement without war, realizing that any negotiations entered into would be long, hard, and dangerous; lastly, stick to our own ideals, for these were the basis of our convictions in

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[44]Bulletin XXII, June 13, 1950:1038 [address before the Civic Federation of Dallas and the Community Course of Southern Methodist University, Dallas].

[45]Ibid.

[46]Bulletin XXII, March 16, 1950:447-48.

[47]Bulletin XXII, June 13, 1950:1038.

pursuing any policy goal. Let us now consider each of these propositions in some detail.

In dealing with the communist mentality Acheson said, "It is like trying to deal with a force of nature. You can't argue with a river, it is going to flow. You can dam it up, you can put it to useful purposes, you can deflect it, but you can't argue with it."[48] Accordingly, Acheson did not try to argue with Soviet policy. Out of this analysis came his policy of containment which was intended to dam up the impending flow of communism and keep it from flowing into the free world. In order for the policy of "containment" to be successful, however, three elements were necessary. These elements were a strong Western European economy, a politically cohesive atlantic community, and, perhaps most important of all, military power. In implementing this policy the Marshall Plan and the revival of Germany were to bring about the first element; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization symbolized the second; and the development of thermonuclear weapons and maintenance of a viable armed forces was to produce the third. The first two, according to Acheson, were dependent on the third. For he believed that economic recovery and security agreements among the free nations would bear little fruit without sufficient military power to protect and preserve those elements.

Based on Acheson's perception of the Soviet Communist threat,

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[48]Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), p. 138. [Vol. 16.]

he formulated a firm policy of containment to parry the thrusts of the Soviet Union and Communism. Containment was a policy whereby the United States would strengthen and aid those countries still outside the periphery of Soviet influence and friendly to the principles of the Western democracies, so that they might resist the Soviet threat. The catchwords of this policy came to be "situations of strength," "strength at the center," "total diplomacy," "national interest," "self-help," "the missing component," and the "prevention of war." All of these ideas were linked by the one belief that the United States, because of its stature in the world, had to provide the leadership necessary for supplying the material and psychological support to those nations wanting to remain free from Communist domination.

Fundamental to the overall policy of "containment" was the concept of "situations of strength." Acheson believed that Soviet influence would flow into any area of weakness that existed around its periphery. To Acheson, this meant that the United States had to establish military, political, and economic positions of strength where ever these situations of weakness were thought to exist. More than this, he felt that until the Soviet leaders were convinced that they could not profit from their policy of expansionism, that meaningful and fruitful negotiations would not be possible.

Concurrently, Acheson saw integrated and balanced economic and military arrangements between the United States and Western Europe as another key to containing Soviet and Communist expansion. He described this as a need for "strength at the center" and in an

interview where he was asked, "Where is our major weight to be put in this shifting contest with the Soviet Union?" Acheson replied:

> It is very hard to put our major attention anywhere. We have to look at all these points [throughout the world] and work at all of them together. But I think that we must put our major effort at the present moment into creating strong North Atlantic defense forces. If we have these forces . . . strong, well-equipped, able and ready to deter aggression, then problems all over the world take on a different shape. Such forces alone will change problems in Greece, Turkey, and in Yugoslavia, in the Middle East and in the Far East.[49]

In analyzing the world situation as he did, two factors seem to have guided Acheson's policy recommendations. First, he seemed to recognize the relationships among the many elements of the foreign policy-making process. Second, was his awareness that the Communist threat was not focused at any one level but rather was an all encompassing thrust at all levels of intensity and with all types of weapons. This meant that not only was Soviet military power a challenge, but poverty, disease, and ignorance were equally beneficial for Communist tactics. That is why Western military strength was not enough. For Acheson, "total diplomacy" was necessary to meet the total Soviet threat. That is why he frankly admitted that self-interest was the basic motive for NATO, the military assistance program, foreign aid, and other national security policies. These programs were not meant to be part of a crusade against evil or as gestures of a worldwide humanitarianism. They were practical

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[49]Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson, p. 27.

necessities which were intended to help facilitate negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Acheson stated that ". . . they have been formulated by us, not as moralists but as servants of government, anxious to get on with . . . practical problems . . . free from fear and uncertainty."[50]

Acheson saw the twentieth century as a period much like that of the nineteenth century with respect to a kinetic power equilibrium dominating international relations. In the new bipolar world of the twentieth century he saw the crucial center of the balance resting in the European continent. Acheson claimed that technical advances had transformed the Atlantic Ocean from a vast protective moat to an undefended plain reaching to the American East coast. To Acheson, this left the United States vulnerable to any hostile European power. It was for this reason that America participated in both world wars, for the domination of Europe by one power would destroy the power balance in Europe and would then present a direct threat to United States national security. In 1945, the beginning of Russian pressures on Western Europe was seen and it was in response to these pressures that Acheson felt a powerful counterbalancing system had to be provided. Thus, NATO was formed and it remains today as the cornerstone of Western defense against the intrusion of Soviet power. In the final analysis, Acheson believed that the ability of NATO to

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[50]McGeorge Bundy, ed., The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), pp. 39-40.

remain strong and adaptable in order to counterbalance the power of the communist states would determine the whole future of Western civilization.

CHAPTER III

DULLES: SECRETARY OF CHURCH AND STATE

During the spring of 1959, John Foster Dulles lay in Walter Reed Hospital dying of cancer. From the responses of many governments around the world, it seemed that they were then forgiving him for what they had termed its inflexible nonnegotiator, its riskful caretaker, its overly stubborn conscience, its tiresome sermonizer, its dualist at the brink. It seems ironical that he was being missed for an outspokenness which, during the previous six years, had made him a target for unmerciful attack both home and abroad. He had been ridiculed at one time or another by men such as Khrushchev and Bulganin, Eden and Nehru, Acheson and Fulbright. Dulles inspired such disrepute among his contemporaries in diplomacy that Marshal Bulganin, while serving as Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union, acutally wrote a letter to President Eisenhower urging him to dismiss Dulles as Secretary of State because he felt nothing useful could be accomplished between the two countries as long as Dulles remained in office.

Needless to say, Dulles was a man who inspired controversy from the day he took office to his dying days at Walter Reed. This controversey stemmed from such actions as his issuing a directive to the State Department calling for "positive loyalty" in response

to the McCarthy hysteria which had gripped the country during the decade of the 1950s. Even as he lay dying he perpetuated the controversy by working on what he considered to be a "fresh and clear statement of Western ideals and aspirations." At the center of the controversy which swirled about him was his deep religious faith. It was upon this faith that he based his constant warning of the Communist threat and demanded that the Free World align itself with his uncompromising views. In spite of the controversy, however, Dulles was seen throughout the world as the generative power behind American foreign policy.

As Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, Dulles was not merely an architect of American foreign policy as was Acheson before him, he was its principle negotiator. With the full support of the President he probably wielded more power than any other Secretary of State of modern times. An illustration of this power is given in a statement by a French Foreign Minister who stated, "We felt that Dulles was the United States and the United States was Dulles. He gave this feeling to the whole world."[51] Thus, Dulles left no doubt in the minds of diplomats around the world that he was the symbol of American power.

Additionally, it might be said that no modern Secretary of State came to office with as much experience and training as Dulles.

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[51]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 13.

His family background contributed greatly to this fact, for he was a grandson of a Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison and the nephew of a Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson. Between periods of private law practice with the esteemed New York firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, he had himself served the government under Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. As a Republican and a strong advocate of bipartisanship in foreign affairs, he had worked closely with five successive Democratic Secretaries from Cordell Hull to Dean Acheson. Working in the government he had helped to negotiate much of the international postwar treaty structure, not the least of which was his deft handling of the Japanese Peace Treaty. He was also instrumental in organizing the United Nations. Because of his intense distrust of Communism in general and Soviet Communism in particular, he made it a point to educate himself to Soviet Communist doctrine. In accomplishing this task, he read extensively works by Marx and particularly Stalin's Problems of Leninism. Along with the Bible and the Federalist Papers he committed much of these works to memory and quoted from them often.

Significant Influences during the Early Years

One of the important influences on John Foster Dulles as a young boy was that of his grandfather, Foster Dulles. Henderson Harbor was a resort town on Lake Ontario some twenty-five miles south of Dulles' hometown of Watertown, New York. It was here that Foster Dulles and his wife would join the rest of the Dulles family

for the summer after leaving the tropical heat of Washington. Here John Dulles spent the better part of every summer until he was well into his teens, learning to fish and sail, and listening to his grandfather talk about pioneering, war, diplomacy and the law. By the time these vacations had become a yearly happening Foster Dulles had retired as Secretary of State but was legal advisor to the Imperialist Government of China. Because of their grandfather's station the Dulles children were afforded a unique opportunity to come in contact with a steady stream of distinguished visitors to Henderson Harbor. These visitors included Chinese gentlemen, European ambassadors, American politicians, journalists, and other men of distinction who came to rest and talk over the problems of the world. One frequent visitor, and another influence on John Dulles, was Robert Lansing, a young Watertown attorney and aspiring Democratic politician. Lansing eventually became Dulles' uncle and served as Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.

Another important influence on Dulles' life was the very nature of the summer vacations which took place at Henderson Harbor. For these vacations provided Dulles with experiences which he would carry with him throughout the rest of his life. It is, therefore, important to note that Henderson Harbor was somewhat of an artificial environment; sheltered from the hustle and confusion of the real world, where young lives could develop in close harmony with nature. It was here, with the whole family gathered, that the elder members tried to instill a moral purpose, a family pride, and a sense of

worldly opportunities and obligations which lay ahead for the younger members of the family. This meant that even though they were on vacation the children were required to take regular religious instruction, to pray every morning, and commit to memory large segments of A Pilgrim's Progress. The influence of world affairs, like that of religion, was so pervasive during these vacations that even during a leisurely activity as eating lunch after a morning of fishing, the talk which followed the meal would invariably include a discussion of the affairs of the world. It was John and his brother Allen who most often formed the audience for such discussions among men who had made their place, exercised some degree of authority, and struggled with large problems of political and international diplomacy. This combination of serious talk of Paris and Peking among the lonely pines along a northern lake seem to have contributed more to making Dulles what the writer calls a "cosmopolitan Puritan" than any other single factor.

Politics and Religion: Original Thoughts on World Peace

Dulles was well into his forties before he bagan reflecting back to the idyllic days of Henderson Harbor and the early influences which were to shape his later perceptions of international affairs. The reasons for this reflection on the past were many, but they all revolved around the deteriorating international environment of that time. Within a ten-year period (1930 to 1940) the Great Depression had occurred, the fragile world structure he had seen built in Paris

began to collapse, and the death knell of that structure had been dealt by Hitler in 1936, with the German reoccupation of the Rineland. These developments led Dulles to contemplate the economic despair of his own countrymen in the early 1930s and the uncertainty of American hopes for the world in the latter part of the decade. It was 1936, when he seriously began addressing himself to the problems of war and peace, in speeches, articles, and culminating in a book published in 1939, War, Peace, and Change.

According to Dulles, the international events of the 1930s were a continuation of the struggle ". . . between the dynamic and the static--the urge to acquire and the desire to retain." He believed that it was the failure of the great democracies of the world to check the aggressive tendencies of nations like the three fascist regimes of that time (Germany, Italy, and Japan) that allowed eruptions in the international environment to occur. These eruptions could not be controlled as long as any nation, especially the democratic nations, identified peace with the status quo or stability with rigidity. He felt that all nations had to accept the fact that change was inevitable and natural in international affairs as in other areas. His point was that such change should be allowed to occur without violent eruptions which upset the stability of the entire international system. In an address he gave at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, in March 1936, "Peaceful Change within the Society of Nations," Dulles emphasized the idea that people had to accept the realization of change in the international system,

even though they might not understand the forces compelling such change. Rigidity in the face of change often resulted in the destruction of nations. He stated, "Change is the ultimate fact to which we must accommodate ourselves. . . ." In allowing for change in the international environment he felt that nations had a choice. Change could be "gentle and benign" or it could be "violent and destructive." "Violent and destructive" change occurred when a nation placed a "rigid envelope" around a dynamic people. "Peaceful change" occurred only if restraints were flexible and allowed for gradual relocations of power and other elements within the international system. To Dulles, the choice was clear, the one chosen depended on the nations of the system.

Although Dulles believed that others had tried to develop an international system based on international law and order, he felt that previous attempts had all been falsely based on the assumption of preserving the status quo. Dulles' mechanism for allowing for peaceful change was conceived as a League-type assembly or council based on Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 19 provided,

> The Assembly may, from time to time, advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.[52]

This is not to say that Dulles believed the bonds of national

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[52]John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 18.

sovereignty could be breeched by a single action. On the contrary, he realized that any development of an international organization would have to come at its own pace and be supported by mass opinion. In a speech given at Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, in 1942, he suggested that technological developments had made the world economically interdependent. Dulles stated, "What science can do politics must match. The problem is to get started in the right direction." In other words, when the scientific community encountered a problem, it tried to develop a new gadget or device to cope with that problem. By extension, Dulles felt that the political community had to come up with a new technological device in foreign relations to cope with the newly emerging problems of interdependence, nationalism, and the Cold War.

In prescribing a solution for this problem as it applied to the United States in particular and the world in general, Dulles firmly rejected the idea of the United States isolating itself. He stated, "It is by no means certain that the rest of the world would tolerate our isolation. . . ."[53] Dulles also rejected the idea of a "supra-national" or "world" government, for while he knew interdependence was a worldwide phenomenon he also knew it did not automatically equate to universal acceptance of a new world order. Needless to say, Dulles did not feel that people had a sufficient worldwide awareness in order to be able to accept a world government in place of their national government. Additionally, the complications were far too great for any governing group to honestly accept, or practically

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[53]Henry P. Van Dusen, ed., The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959), pp. xviii-xxi.

discharge, a worldwide trustee responsibility. By the same token, he rejected a union of the democracies as being too narrowly based and only serving to alienate the nondemocratic nations. He stated,

> Indeed, the unordered interdependence which leads to war actually is found largely between the democratic and nondemocratic countries. . . . The so-called democratic nations are, generally speaking, the richer and more satisfied. The nondemocratic nations are, usually, the poorer nations. Thus a federation of the so-called democracies would, to others, appear as a banding together of the well-to-do to maintain the status quo. A natural reaction would be a banding together of the dissatisfied peoples in a counteralliance.[54]

But, he contended, if a League-type Assembly or Council could be established as a world legislature and appointing authority, and a World Court as a judiciary, he felt an initial step might be taken toward establishing a supranational executive authority. It would be an executive organ which would be responsible for operating a Monetary and Banking Corporation as a clearinghouse for world trade and also for chartering commercial companies subject to its own taxation and regulation, immune from national control of the same type. He believed that the establishment of functional agencies not subject to any national sovereign would begin ". . . that dilution of sovereignty which all enlightened thinkers agree to be indispensable."

Behind all these beliefs, however, lay one dominant and determining factor. That factor was his deep-seated religious convictions which permeated his attitudes toward public affairs. It was upon his religious convictions that he tought the foundation principles of a new world order should be laid.

As Van Deusen observed,

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[54]Quoted in Louis L. Gerson, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, v. 17, John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967), pp. 20-21.

> He often spoke of the ethical precepts of Jesus. He regarded them, not as counsels of perfection with authority solely upon religious devotees or as specifications for some transworldly Kingdom, but as guiding principles for daily life and practice here and now, not only of individuals but also of communities and the world community. He believed that Christ gives and expects four indispensable qualities: vision, compassion, clarity of mind, and action.[55]

It is clear from an examination of thoughts on religion that the church movement for peace played a very significant part in his overall conceptual framework of how to go about solving the problems of the international environment. Dulles is unusual in that he combined this religious fervor with the incisive and practical mentality of a lawyer in dealing with international affairs. There were occasions when one element was utilized at the expense of the other. It was on these occasions that Dulles, as Secretary of State, sometimes incurred the intense criticism that came to plague him.

World War II: The Crusade Begins

As the United States moved toward war, Dulles concentrated his energies to postwar planning. In 1940, Dulles became chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. From this religious forum Dulles soon became identified as not only an outstanding lay church leader but as a Republican spokesman on foreign affairs. He soon became known throughout the country. In discussing the factors contributing to the international turmoil taking place at the time, Dulles

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[55]Henry P. Van Deusen, ed., The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles: Selections from his Articles and Addresses (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), pp. xviii-xxi.

pointed to the shortcomings of the leadership in the Western World as one of the primary ones. Specifically, he criticized President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. As long as a year before Pearl Harbor, Dulles criticized the British and American governments for not being able or willing to take lead in organizing public opinion against hysteria and for "a course of wisdom." He felt that both governments, by appealing to emotion and encouraging hatred of Germany and later Japan, were building an "ephemeral and dangerous" unity which only served the "necessities of the moment." In a speech he gave to the Young Men's Christian Association in January 1941, he said, "There is no effort in government to educate the people in terms of specific long-range objectives. . . ." Dulles was fearful of the effects on postwar planning. He stated in his Young Men's Christian Association speech that Roosevelt's and Churchill's abstention from stating their postwar aims, convinced him of their seeking ". . . little more than to recreate the very conditions which had bred the present war." He stated that ". . . only rarely did a nation produce leadership which dared to meet national emergencies other than with the dynamism of cheap emotion." According to Dulles, Lincoln and Wilson were such rare leaders who sought understanding, not hate; and who wanted to build, not destroy. He conceded that they may have fallen short of their goals, but blamed their failure on a lack of support by the people. Dulles concluded that it was necessary to have both enlightened leadership, like that of Wilson and Lincoln, and support from a "steady weight of public opinion." The first

element had to be supplied by the leaders themselves, the second element had to be supplied by the churches.[56]

As postwar planning came to preoccupy him, the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 gave Dulles his first major opportunity to project his Christian ideas into the political realm. In the statement of criticism which he prepared for the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, he accurately warned that the end of the war would leave overwhelming power in the hands of one or two nations. He stated that these powerful nations should, ". . . create, support, and eventually give way to international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family of nations."[57] Dulles urged that these nations should be prepared to aid the war-torn nations, develop and organize the political structure of Europe into a commonwealth, assure Japan of economic opportunity, preserve China from domination by Japan and any other nation, and consolidate all nonself-governing people under an international mandate system. After the United States entered the war, Dulles took his case to the nation and rigorously tried to educate the American people to the need of world organizations. He travelled around the country with leading ministers and other laymen setting up and conducting study groups on postwar

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[56]Louis L. Gerson, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vol. 17: John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967), pp. 20-21, cited from "The Christian Forces and a Stable Peace" [address to Young Men's Christian Association National Board, New York, January 25, 1941].

[57]Ibid., p. 21.

planning. These sessions resulted in proposals which the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace produced into a pamphlet, "Six Pillars of Peace" which was published in 1943.

Dulles, once again using the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace as the vehicle for his views, decided that the pamphlet warranted the attention of President Roosevelt. On March 26, 1943, he met with Roosevelt and told him that "Six Pillars of Peace" was a proposal for the American people to commit themselves to international collaboration in six major areas. Of the six major areas the first requested the victorious nations to provide a peace which was flexible, creative, curative, and not repressive. The remaining areas urged international agreement on financial and economic matters; revising treaties to meet changing conditions in the international environment; giving autonomy to nonself-governed peoples; control of armaments, giving people everywhere the right to intellectual and religious freedom. For Dulles, the purpose of the proposals was simple. Its primary purpose was to draw from the American people a mandate to their government. If such a consensus of the American people could be brought about, Dulles believed that it would serve as the foundation upon which organized international collaboration could take place. It then followed that if international collaboration were undertaken by all nations that no nation would try to impose its will on any other.[58] By the end of 1943, it appeared that Dulles' campaign

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[58]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

to influence American public opinion had paid off, for in that year both Houses had passed resolutions favoring world organization. He came a step closer to his goal when President Roosevelt sent Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Moscow where, in October 1943, the allies issued the Four Nations Declaration which led to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and eventually the United Nations.

As might be expected, a religious theme continued to run throughout Dulles' wartime thoughts on international affairs, a theme he would continue to the end of his days. And when Dulles became Secretary of State he consistently remarked that mankind could never prosper in peace unless such peace was supported by moral and spiritual power. He realized that peace could not be attained by a simple stroke of a pen. His first confrontation with Communist ambition at the San Francisco, California, Conference made that fact quite apparent to him. This intensified his belief that only efforts initiated from deep spiritual conviction would ward off the peril of communism and bring about the stable, peaceful international environment. In a private letter dated February 13, 1950, he wrote, "I am convinced that we here need to make our political thoughts and practices reflect more faithfully a religious belief that man has his origin and destiny in God. . . ."[59] Dulles repeatedly pointed out the Western world's belief in equal rights, the dignity of all men, and the sacredness of the individual. To him, this common belief was to serve

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[59]Ibid., p. 25.

as the foundation of American foreign policy in the Cold War.

Relating Theory to Reality

Having arranged his ideas on foreign policy on a theoretical plane, Dulles entered the world of diplomatic practice. Although he had attended the Paris Peace Conference, France, in 1919, his real diplomatic experience began in 1945, at the San Francisco Conference. San Francisco was the first of many conferences in which he was to participate as unofficial advisor to four democratic Secretaries of State. Serving under Secretaries like Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., James F. Byrnes, George C. Marshall, and Dean Acheson, gave him the opportunity to test his theories. He began his experience in diplomacy with several basic convictions. He felt that peace was like war in that it had to be waged and required idealism, sacrifice, courage, and faith. He felt the United States had an obligation to itself and the rest of the world to participate in world affairs. Although he never did like dealing with the Soviet Union, Dulles felt that the United States must cooperate with it whenever possible. He believed that treaties must allow for change and be updated from time to time as was necessary. Finally, he believed that American foreign policy required bipartisan support in order to gain the support of American public opinion. It was during the period 1945 to 1951 that Dulles owed much to the Democratic administration for allowing him to serve his country in the cause of peace.

For Dulles, the United Nations Conference on International

Organization became his initiation into diplomacy during the Cold War era. As an appointed official of the American delegation Dulles was personally responsible for many of the clauses of the United Nations Charter. But this brought little enthusiasm to Dulles as it should have, for it was here that Dulles had his first encounter with Soviet representatives. After meeting Vyacheslov M. Molotov and Andrei A. Gromyko his expectations had been significantly sobered. He left the conference believing that the great powers did offer mankind a chance, but only a chance. The new world organization was not a cure-all and it could not become a substitute for foreign policy. He realized that it did not relieve the United States of major responsibilities, but its presence could be utilized in carrying out American foreign policy. He wrote in Foreign Affairs for October, 1945, "The present charter represents a conscientious and successful effort to create the best world organization which the realities permit. . . . The task of statesmanship, however, is to relate theory to reality."

Interpreting Soviet Policy as a Threat

Like many other Americans, despite distrust of Soviet intentions, Dulles felt the Soviet Union would welcome American cooperation and aid at the end of the war. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union seemed to shun American overtures at normalizing relations between the two countries. Dulles was perplexed by this negative reaction by the Russians. He wondered whether Soviet behavior stemmed from a fear of capitalist encirclement or whether it was fear of the American

presence in Europe. He thought it might have been dissension among the Soviet leadership itself. Whatever the cause, Dulles felt the action taken by the Russians after the war dangerously impeded any progress toward a peaceful and secure world.

According to Dulles, the Soviet challenge was two-fold. One of its aims was that of precipitating social revolution throughout the world. The other aim was to expand and gain hegemony over as much territory as possible. Dulles contended that Soviet foreign policy was determined by the communist creed as it was expressed in Stalin's Problems of Leninism, and not from words of Soviet leaders often uttered to confuse. What counted to Dulles was not what the Russians said but what they did. He compared Stalin's work to that of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Western statesmen had ignored Hitler's book at their own risk and to their later regret. Soviet foreign policy was worldwide and sought a Pax Sovietica. To achieve this goal Dulles perceived Soviet foreign policy as a program which divided the world into three areas: the Soviet Inner Zone, Middle Zone, and Outer Zone. In a private letter to Roswell T. Barnes on May 8, 1946, Dulles explained this perception and its possible consequences. The Inner Zone comprised the Soviet Union itself which had already become much expanded by that time with Hitler's concessions during the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon which gave the Russians part of Finland, all of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and large portions of Poland and Rumania. Further expansion took place after Germany attacked Russia; for the Western powers, anxious to preserve unity, made concessions to their

new ally at Teheran and Yalta which extended Soviet land power in Europe and the Far East. The Middle Zone was comprised of the states on the Russian periphery which were under Soviet power. This included those states within its orbit and those which were gravitating toward it. The Outer Zone consisted of the rest of the world. In those areas not directly under Soviet control, the Communist Party, using tactics such as infiltration and propaganda, tried to take advantage of mass discontent. In Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Western Europe, the Communists promoted a Soviet system of proletarian dictatorship. Dulles believed that all of these actions were directed against the free world and warned that such actions threatened the traditions of Western civilization.[60]

Once Dulles became Secretary of State he believed more deeply than ever that the American Government had to prove to the Soviet Union by words and deeds that Soviet plans for worldwide hegemony could not succeed. Discussing this course of action Dulles stated:

> Twice within 25 years the U.S. has been drawn into a world war because the American people finally came to feel that aggressive policies in Europe and Asia threatened our conception of democracy and our ideals of personal freedom. In each case the foreign leaders would probably have followed a different course had they, at an early stage, realized that the American people would react as they did. In not making apparent, in time, our devotion to our ideals, we were guilty of contributory negligence. We must not make the same mistake three times in a generation.[61]

Dulles was skeptical about the United States ever being able

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[60] Ibid., pp. 44-45 [quoted from a letter to Roswell T. Barnes et al., May 8, 1946, Dulles MSS].

[61] Ibid., p. 46.

to change the Soviet Union, but felt that American foreign policy must be carried out on the assumption that something could be done. In other words, Dulles was under no illusions when it came to negotiating with the Soviet leaders, whether it was at the summit, at foreign ministers conferences, or through traditional diplomacy. He would constantly remind himself and others of the difficulty in negotiating with the Soviets by reciting the number of meetings--about 400--that preceded the signing of the Austrian State Treaty whereby the Soviets and the Western Powers evacuated and neutralized that country; the number of months of discussion--thirty--that preceded the signing of the cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union; the number of meetings--575--required to reach an armistice in Korea; and the number of months of negotiation--about thirty-five--needed for agreement on the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

During the decade between the end of the war and the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1955, Dulles had spent about one full year in conferences with the Russians. From this extended period of contact he had come away with certain distinct impressions. Some of those impressions as he stated them were as follows:

> To negotiate with the Soviets you have to have almost superhuman patience. . . . Perhaps they hope to wear down your patience and get you to sign an unwise agreement. . . . Or perhaps they hope that you will abruptly break up the conference or negotiations and thereby incur the onus for disrupting an effort toward peace. . . . you can make concessions, but only in return for concessions of equivalent value. . . .
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> . . . When the Soviets start a probing operation such as they started on Berlin, they do not shift until the last moment. . . .

> They wait to see if the other fellow won't shift. If he doesn't, than they're willing to give up the idea of an ultimatum and start talking.
>
> To negotiate with the Soviets you've got to know their ways of thinking and talking. . . . You've got to know what's behind the words before you agree to any set of words.[62]

It was around these general impressions that Dulles formulated his policy ideas, especially in dealing with what he perceived as the Communist threat. It is in the light of these perceptions that his actions as Secretary of State will be considered.

The Origins of a Foreign Policy: 1951 to 1952

Dulles, because of his extensive diplomatic experience since 1945, was asked to draw up the plank on foreign policy for the Republican Party Platform. His plank contained two major themes. The first theme called attention to what Dulles saw as an inadequacy in American postwar policies. Such courageous and dynamic actions as the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the decision to go to war in Korea, had failed to end the threat of Communism. The second theme called attention to the worsening economic conditions brought about through such policies. He described the Administration's security policies as being extremely costly, having led to unbalanced budgets and a cheapening of the dollar. He described

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[62]Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1965), p. 45

Europeans as finding the United States ". . . too militaristic, too costly, too erratic and too inconclusive." He felt the ". . . far-flung, extravagant and surreptitious military projects . . ." disillusioned and frightened allies and friends, who believed the United States was engaging in a feud with the Russians ". . . rather than performing a public service for peace." He wrote that all major policies since the end of World War II were reflex actions which involved emergency measures to contain the Communist threat. To Dulles, they were negative policies which were unable to stop the flow of Communism or bring relief from the tremendous economic strain it placed on the American people.[63]

To help alleviate this state of affairs Dulles believed the futile policy of "containment" must be discontinued for it led the United States into misusing its strength, in spite of its being the strongest nation in the world. The one essential element he thought was missing was that of faith. The United States, according to Dulles, was not only materially stronger but it was also morally stronger than the Soviet Union. The proof to Dulles lay in the fact that there were fifteen million prisoners in Soviet labor camps, that liberty in the satellite countries had to be constantly suppressed, and that there were constant disputes, suspicions and purges among the Soviet leadership. Overall, Dulles perceived this as corruption and weakness and

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[63]Ibid., pp. 46-47.

not strength. He revealed this feeling when he stated, "The free should not be numbed by the sight of this vast graveyard of human liberties. It is the despots who should feel haunted. They, not we, should fear the future."[64] In other words, America's moral might was as important if not more important than its material might in overcoming the subversive effects of Communism.

This is not to say that Dulles underrated the role of the military. For he knew that any successful foreign policy had to be based on a viable and credible military establishment. According to Dulles, a successful military policy was one based on the concept of deterrence. Dulles felt that America's military obligation extended not only to Europe but to all areas of the world including the Middle East, the Far East, and even Africa. Such deterrence was not possible by trying to match the Red Army man for man or gun for gun, or by trying to answer every Soviet challenge at a time and place of their own choosing. Dulles stated the solution when he said:

> There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red Armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing. . . .[65]

To underscore this belief Dulles reiterated that he had only supported the North Atlantic Pact because it did not commit the United States to

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Gerson, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vol. 17: John Foster Dulles, p. 72.

the defense of any particular area but rather left the action to take place in an area of America's own choosing. Dulles believed that the existence of a "community punishing force," ready to react to any hostile communist action, at a time and place of its choosing, would provide the Western powers with an "enlightened and effective" deterrent until some future date when international disarmament would hopefully make a policy of deterrence obsolete.

To complement this military policy of "deterrence" Dulles developed a second concept of "liberation." To Dulles an effective military defense and strategy was only the first step in a successfull overall foreign policy. In addition he felt the free world, under the guidance of the United States, should undertake a political offensive based on principles of the American Revolution. Dulles based his reasoning on what he felt were natural truths. These truths were: dynamic forces always prevail over static, active over passive; non-material forces have a more powerful effect than material; and moral or natural law, not made by man, determines right or wrong; and in the long run only those nations conforming to this law escape disaster. Dulles believed that concepts like vigor, confidence, sense of destiny, belief in mission, and dynamism had significantly contributed to the tremendous growth of the American Republic. American dynamism was based on moral and intellectual forces rather than military or material power. America was the conscience of mankind and the Russians could not be allowed to replace it. He urged that America recapture the historic qualities of its people and the spirit which dominated

the American Revolution. He believed that stalemate and a policy like "containment" were unacceptable in light of the American experience. As the historic leader of the free world, the United States had to abandon alien policies and adopt a positive and dynamic concept. "Liberation" was that concept. He urged the American government to publicly state its expectations for liberation. This end would be peacefully sought but the United States would not participate in any "deal" abdicating to Soviet rule over the satellite countries. Dulles believed that such a public statement would inspire captive people everywhere and put the Russians on the defensive. The result would be a peaceful separation from Moscow's tutelage as had occurred in Tito's Yugoslavia.[66]

The doctrine of liberation especially appealed to Dulles because of its kinship to Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination. Like Wilson, he would encourage people in Eastern Europe and elsewhere to look to the United States for political freedom. And although he was not to be as successful in this endeavor as he would have liked, this was the guiding principle behind which he formulated American foreign policy.

Dulles as Secretary of State

Having developed his perceptions of foreign relations over a forty-year period, Dulles undertook his task with a determination to

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[66]Ibid., pp. 71-72.

reorganize the Department to free himself from administrative and ceremonial chores so that he could strike out and blaze new paths in foreign policy. But despite the full support of the President the latter hope proved to be unattainable. He soon lerned that foreign policies did not begin or end with new or preceding administrations. He came to realize that neither he, nor for that matter the President, had the freedom to act independently from the consensus of the rest of the American government or the public opinion of the American people. In September, 1954, he admitted that he had proposed many answers to the problems of the Cold War before becoming Secretary of State, but once in office his solutions were not as readily accepted or as successful as he had believed they would be. He blamed this lack of effectiveness on the very nature of the American form of government which severely limited the actions of the executive. He felt that a greater latitude should have been granted to the executive in using what he termed "war powers." For he felt that the Cold War was just that, a war, which could not be waged successfully as long as the executive had to work on a peacetime basis.[67]

Dulles' attitude when he took office, in conjunction with the unfavorable international conditions at the time, led to the many hardships he encountered throughout his six-year tenure as Secretary of State. Dulles seemed to believe that because he had forty years of

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[67] Ibid., pp. 72-73; see also "A Policy of Boldness," Life, May 9, 1952 [a reprint with minor alterations of the memorandum given to President Eisenhower in March 1952].

experience behind him he could assume the burden of Secretary of State without any fumbling. Ironically though, no Secretary became as mired in controversy and debate as did Dulles upon taking office. The Eisenhower Administration had been elected on its assurance that it would end "crisis-government" and put an end to the wearying and frustrating Korean War. However, the Republican Party was deeply divided on foreign policy. Senator Joseph McCarthy was ready to continue his assault on the State Department referring to it as a den of un-Americanism. Adding to the divisiveness which already existed within the party, Dulles perpetuated it through the Republican foreign policy platform which he had largely written himself. The plank condemned the Truman-Acheson policies which he had so often served. It grossly exaggerated the prospect of "liberation." It prophesied the "beginning of the end" of Soviet power. In other words, it promised the impossible. Dulles went so far in condemning the previous Democratic administrations and their foreign policies that he not only contradicted his earlier writings on foreign policy, but gave the impression to the right-wing leaders of the party that he was their friend and ally while alienating the members of the left. In essence, Dulles' problems were largely the result of statements like the one which declared that a Republican victory would "mark the end of the Democrats' negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism, which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon

for our destruction. . . ."[68]

Dulles had started the Republican juggernaut in motion but it soon got to the point where he was no longer in control of its actions. An illustration of this campaign oratory gone wild was when the Republicans had additionally pledged that ". . . the Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those at Yalta which aid Communist enslavement."[69] Of course, this was another move by the Eisenhower Administration to appease the right wing of the party. But soon after taking office, Dulles had to publicly abandon this high-sounding part of the platform because it was against American interests. Involved in the practical application of foreign policy, Dulles realized that any congressional resolution which repudiated American wartime commitments would become a two-edged sword which the Kremlin could turn against the United States. In addition, Dulles soon conceded his belief that the Truman Administration had many sound and courageous accomplishments to its credit. He admitted this in one of his early speeches as Secretary: "First of all, let us recognize that many of the preceding foreign policies were good. . . ."[70] However, such measures proved to be too

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[68]Gerson, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vol. 17: John Foster Dulles, p. 142.

[69]Ibid., p. 143.

[70]Ibid., pp. 142-43.

little too late in reversing the critical trend which had been set during the campaign. Many of the party's leaders in Congress, long reduced to the role of minority opposition, did not know how to respond to the realities of the world situation. In fact, such an adversary relationship developed between some Republican leaders in the Congress and the administration over foreign policy that action was taken by some members of Congress to curtail the administration's ability to carry out foreign policy. As an example, Senator William F. Knowland of California, the new assistant majority leader, repeatedly sought to maneuver the party against Eisenhower and Dulles. Furthermore, Senator John Bricker of Ohio set out to try to amend the Constitution to diminish the President's authority in foreign policy. Furthermore, Senator McCarthy, soon after the Eisenhower administration took office, disclosed his mistrust that it would be able to purge the government of security risks. This was the situation which Dulles faced on the domestic front. Some of it was beyond Dulles' control, but in view of his inflammatory remarks during the campaign much of it can be said to be attributable to him.

Against this less than desirable situation facing him on the domestic front, Dulles was confronted with a deteriorating international situation. Soviet power was on the rise and it was becoming steadily greater and more resourceful. In order to measure and assess the events which Dulles was able to shape successfully, and those he shaped badly or not at all, it might be useful to scan the world as it presented itself when he took over as Secretary of State. It had been

eight years since the end of the war and crisis loomed in every direction.

A massive force of 400,000 Soviet troops was garrisoned in East Germany up to the Elbe. There was no comparable accumulation of power in Western Europe. In Korea, the Red Chinese were dragging out the long and trying truce negotiations. In Indochina, Peking was promoting the Vietminh Communist rebellion against the French and the drama of Dienbienphu was only a year and a half away. In Paris, the French were looking for ways to bury the hopes for the supranational European Army Plan (E.D.C.) that was to have paved the way for a United States of Europe. Adenauer's West Germany was beginning to regain its economic strength, but without sufficient arms it was groping for an alliance with the Western world. In Moscow, Stalin, who had united the West with his ruthless tactics, had only two months to live.

As would become his custom, Dulles greeted Stalin's death with a statement which combined exaggerated optimism with the empty promises which characterized many of his early pronouncements. In just his second of the many reports he would give to the American people, he profoundly and inaccurately stated, "The Stalin era has ended and the Eisenhower era has begun, bringing with it new hope for all mankind. Already that prediction is in the process of confirmation."[71]

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[71]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 63-64.

What Dulles did not realize was that Stalin's death probably helped the Soviet Union more than it hurt it. For the new Soviet dictatorship which took over after Stalin was more capable of maneuver, more able to deal with the vast national energies of the Soviet Union, and more formidable an adversary than Russia had been with Stalin. In addition, the Soviet achievement of exploding a hydrogen bomb only seven months after Dulles took office, dissolved the last trace of American nuclear superiority. This was the foreboding situation which Dulles faced at home and abroad at the start of his Secretaryship.

Dulles took office determined not to make the same mistakes in public relations that Acheson did. He believed that Acheson had projected the image of an intellectual who condescended to speak to Congress and the public and in so doing alienated congressional and public opinion. To avoid such alienation Dulles, from the start, made himself far more accessible to the press and far more communicative to the public than had Acheson. He often subjected himself to probing questions by both American and foreign correspondents. His purpose was to allow the public to know and understand the purposes and motives behind specific policies so that they might feel a greater sense of participation in foreign policy. But as he did in drawing up the Republican platform on foreign policy, he ended up drawing a response which was the opposite of what he expected. Dulles was an individual of paradox. As a lawyer he would, on occasion, state with rare precision, exactly what he wanted to say and no more. On other

occasions, however, he would, as a public advocate trying to rally public support for a certain policy, use gross oversimplifications. The concept of "liberation" is one such oversimplification. He would also mislead the general public and confuse and alienate those with a more sophisticated appreciation for foreign policy by prescribing that the Soviet Union made substantial modifications to its basic Marxist-Communist creed. Dulles' problem stemmed from using too much logic, too much detachment, and too little intuition. He was well-versed in the mechanics of modern public relations, but he lacked the intuition and the talent to use them in a way that would benefit him.

Thus, in a renowned interview with Life magazine, Dulles demonstrated his tendency to use words which distorted his actual policies. One of the statements he made during the interview was, "The ability to get to the verge of war without getting into war is the necessary art. If you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost." His detractors would take this statement and invent the term "brinkmanship" which plagued him throughout his years as Secretary of State. In actuality, what Dulles meant was that in order to prevent a war the United States could not retreat in the face of threats and bluffs by the Russians, even if it meant going to the verge of war. In dealing with the Russians, Dulles felt appeasement was more fatal than war itself, for it allowed the Russians to obtain their objectives without firing a shot, so to speak. Whether the policy was right or not, the image of "brinkmanship" in the nuclear age frightened a

world tired of war.[72]

The one policy, however, which bore the brunt of the criticism which Dulles received was that of "liberation." Dulles deeply yearned to replace what he denounced as the Democrat's "immoral" concept of "containment" with the Republican policy of "liberation." Like the man himself, this policy inspired intense and divisive controversy. It gave the impression to the world that he aimed to promote a violent revolution within the confines of the Communist world. This, of course, was never the fact. Dulles had made it clear in numerous writings that his policy of "liberation" did not rest upon the use of force. In War or Peace, the book in which he laid out in 1950 his advance design of his strategy as Secretary, he wrote, as cited by Drummond and Coblenz:

> The people have no arms, and violent revolt would be futile. Indeed, it would be worse than futile, for it would precipitate massacre. We do not want to do to the captive peoples what the Soviet Union did to the Polish patriots in Warsaw under General Bor. . . . We have no desire to weaken the Soviet Union at the cost of the lives of those who are our primary concern.[73]

He proposed instead to exert intense, unrelenting political, economic, and moral pressure on the Communist Empire from outside its borders, and to "activate" the same barrage of pressures inside its confines. Then, he wrote in an article in 1952 entitled "A Policy of Boldness":

> We can be confident that within two, five, or ten years substantial parts of the present captive world can peacefully regain

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[72]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[73]Ibid., p. 71.

> national independence. That will mark the beginning of the end of Soviet despotism's attempt at world conquest.[74]

Of course, his prediction for a communist rollback did not materialize but he stubbornly refused to abandon his rollback hopes throughout his tenure as Secretary. Dulles set himself what seemed to be an impossible goal, but to a man with the moral spirit and faith that he demonstrated throughout his life, nothing was impossible.

In spite of the various inconsistencies and paradoxes which surrounded Dulles and his policies, there was little reason for surprise at the actions he undertook as Secretary of State. For he had put himself on record in advance with an outline of what he wanted to achieve. This outline was given in his book War or Peace. It was here that he expressed his increasing belief that the Cold War was being dominated by the Soviet Union. Here was his blueprint for a successful foreign policy.

Miscalculation as a Cause of War

Dulles realized the danger that existed in the Communists believing that they could make piecemeal gains without any resistance by the West. He wrote, as cited by Drummond and Coblenz:

> Many believe that if the Kaiser had known in advance that his attack on France by way of Belgium would have brought England, and then the United States, into the fray he would never have made the attack. Because he did not know this with certainty, he took a chance. He lost, and it was not his loss alone, but the loss of all of us.
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> Many also believe that if Hitler had known that his war would

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[74] Ibid.

> involve the United States he would not have started it. Not knowing, he took a chance. He lost, and so did we all.[75]

It was this same reasoning which led Dulles to the conviction that Dean Acheson's remark, placing Korea outside the defense perimeter of the United States, led Stalin to believe he could attack South Korea without a response from the United States. Examples such as these led Dulles to believe that major wars were precipitated by miscalculations on the part of various world leaders. The way to avoid future confrontations precipitated by miscalculations or misunderstandings, according to Dulles, was to leave no doubt in the mind of any national leader as to the intentions of the United States.

Collective Defense

Based upon his intentions to avoid war by miscalculation, Dulles felt the main prerequisite was a strong "collective defense" arrangement among the free nations of the world. According to Dulles, a significant step in the right direction had been taken by Acheson in forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which provided that any attack upon an ally in Europe would be considered an attack on the United States. Dulles believed that such arrangements were the cornerstone of a successful American foreign policy and, thus, went further than any other Secretary in promoting collective defense treaties on nearly every continent.

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[75]Ibid., pp. 72-73.

Limitations of American Power

Contrary to the image he projected as Secretary of State, Dulles knew that the United States could not and should not be dominant in imposing its formula for peace on the world. He stated:

> There are some Americans who rather naively, and to some extent unconsciously, assume that a world at peace will conform to our ideals and our wishes. . . . The world has known periods when a single nation was politically dominant. . . . That kind of peace can be won only by war, and under modern conditions there can never be a successful "war to end war."[76]

Peace without Retribution

After World War II Dulles was determined that there would be no vindictiveness involved in the peace drawn up with the defeated Axis powers. Dulles had witnessed and been profoundly influenced by the vengeful and tragic Treaty of Versailles. An an historian he did not want to repeat the same mistake in less than twenty years. Additionally, Dulles felt the United States had a moral obligation to forgive what was now in the past. It was now time to look forward by binding up the wounds of the past and taking steps to ensure that the same calamity did not occur in the future.

A United Europe

Dulles was probably the most outspoken advocate for a United States of Europe. In trying to accomplish this task he did not hesitate to use influence or pressure. Dulles was so adamant about

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[76] Ibid., pp. 74-75.

Europe uniting that he wrote: "Disunity alone prevents Western Europe from being a great--perhaps the greatest--distinctive area of spiritual, intellectual, economic, and military force. . . ."[77]

Applying Pressure to Prevent War

As Dulles looked over the deteriorating international environment at the beginning of the 1950s, he felt that war was almost inevitable. He wrote: "If history is any guide, war will come out of this situation. There should be no illusion about the reality of the danger. It is immense."[78] Dulles concluded that if the United States was to avoid becoming involved in another world conflict it would have to make an immense effort to preserve the peace. Once again, this meant using any means short of war in preventing gains by the communist nations.

The Complexities of Disarmament

Disarmament, without a doubt, was the most baffling and discouraging problem which Dulles had to deal with. On many occasions he had expressed his chagrin over the difficulties involved in trying to get an agreement with the Russians which meant anything and which could be sufficiently enforced. He wrote:

> Military expenditures in the Soviet Union and in the United States are a great strain on both countries. Therefore, both countries want disarmament. Each of us thinks of the wonderful

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[77] Ibid., p. 75.

[78] Ibid., p. 76.

> things that can be constructed if we could use for peaceful purposes the scores of billions of dollars going into armaments.
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> But I doubt that we can work out an all-inclusive agreement on disarmament. This is too complex. History proves this. Even the allies and friendly powers found it next to impossible in the 1930s to reach agreement. Example, the Geneva naval disarmament negotiations. How much more difficult, therefore, are negotiations with a nation which is antagonistic to us.[79]

The problem of disarmament was one that constantly plagued Dulles. It was to be one issue that totally frustrated him as Secretary of State.

The Element of Religion

Of all the aspects which have been discussed about Dulles' conceptual framework, the element of religion is the most deeply embedded. Looking at this element as it applies to Dulles it has been written that,

> His political thinking could no more be separated from his religion than a lighted bulb from its current. To the skeptical, his persistent religious terminology was sanctimonious. Yet it was anything but a deliberate technique aimed at giving his policies a moral sheen. There is simply no understanding Dulles without understanding the depth of his religious adherence. When he related his understanding of God-created man and moral law to policy, he was being his authentic self. For him to have spoken differently would have been false to himself.[80]

This evaluation of Dulles is substantiated and reinforced when one considers a comment written by Arthur Dean, one of Dulles' law partners and one of his closest lifelong friends. He writes:

> In his life with his father, a Presbyterian minister, and mother, young Dulles was thoroughly unforgettably tutored in the

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[79]Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1965) pp. 87-88.

[80]Drummond and Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power, pp. 76-77.

> fundamentals of the Protestant religion and Protestant ethics. . . . Each week Dulles was required to memorize a passage from the Bible and a verse of a hymn.[81]

It is no wonder then, with all of his exposure to religion, that Dulles spoke not only of communism but of "atheistic" communism. For Dulles everything had to be weighed in the context of being good or bad, moral or immoral, right or wrong. This attitude was begun and manifested from the time he was a young boy in Watertown, New York, but he carried it with him even as Secretary of State. Typical of the criticism which Dulles received in using his religion-weighted vocabulary was a comment made by Nehru's sister, Madame Pandit, to a high-ranking American official. "I can talk easily and frankly with you, but when your Secretary of State and I are discussing matters, God always gets between us. . . ."[82]

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[81] Ibid., p. 77.

[82] Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

KISSINGER AND DETENTE: A PLAN FOR EASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION

Henry Kissinger is a unique personality considering his high governmental position as Secretary of State. He is unique in at least three respects. First, he is an intellectual who has spent the majority of his adult life in a university. During his university days he thought and wrote about international relations, criticizing what he felt were mistakes by national leaders and offering alternatives. Second, he is a scholar who believes that scholarship goes beyond the classroom and that much can be gained through the many other experiences which exist outside of the confines of an academic environment. Third, he is a European. As an American with European roots he is sensitive to nuances of tradition and history and accepts the possibility of tragedy in dealing with the international environment. He is also aware of the concept of power and its ramifications in the field of foreign affairs.

Kissinger's career as an academic stretched over a fifteen-year period in which he wrote four books and numerous articles. It was early in his career when he entered the field of strategic studies. This was a relatively new field of endeavor and its adherents were usually technically proficient in one aspect or other of

the discipline. However, Kissinger found the idea of specializing in abstract formulations such as the kill ratio of a fifty-megaton nuclear warhead too limiting. It is for this reason that he has come to be known as a popularizer and a generalist, not particularly complimentary terms, but appropriate for a man who does not wish to be bound by narrow technical interests.

To Kissinger, even the field of strategy was a very narrow discipline which was merely a part of a larger system of study. His own conceptualization of international studies consisted of the interrelationship of such elements as diplomacy, military strategy, and domestic politics. He felt it impossible to separate one from the other and believed that many of the American failures in foreign policy stemmed from trying to do so. According to Kissinger, it was as natural to study weapons systems as bureaucracy. He found ideology as important as psychology. These factors were dependent on a view of history which considered the possibility of choice, the need for doctrine, and the importance of leadership.

Kissinger became a professor, not wanting to become a mere journalist commenting on and judging the foreign policy performance of every administration. His concern was to take the specific actions of governments and relate them to theories he had developed in order to try to determine the success or failure of such actions. For Kissinger there were certain criteria by which a foreign policy could be judged. For instance, what general principle lay behind a specific policy; how had the policy come to be adopted; were other options

considered; why had they been found wanting; why were others not thought of. If questions like these could be answered, Kissinger believed, the mistakes and failures of past foreign policies could be avoided. But making such a determination depended heavily on the past and a review of the historical record because, although his research was aimed at solving the policy pitfalls of the present and future, Kissinger relied heavily on historical research to provide the answers to many of his questions. Even as Secretary of State he has described the importance history plays in his interpretation of events:

> I think of myself as a historian more than as a statesman. As historian, you have to be conscious of the fact that every civilization that has ever existed has ultimately collapsed. . . .
> . . . So, as a historian, one has to live with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy. As a statesman, one has to act on the assumption that problems must be solved.[83]

Significant Influences during the Early Years

In 1922, a year before Hitler would stage his provocative "beer-hall putsch," Kissinger's parents were married. His father, Louis, was then thirty-five and a respected Studienrat, or teacher-advisor, at the Mädchen-Lyzeum, a high school for privileged girls. Louis' father had also been a teacher and had handed down the traditions of Judaism to his son. These included observing the Sabbath and the High Holy Days of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Frau Emmy

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[83] Interview, The Secretary of State, October 13, 1974, p. 1. From the transcript of an interview of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger by James Reston, as published in the New York Times on October 13, 1974..

Wittenmayer, a contemporary of Kissinger's parents, remembered Louis Kissinger by stating, "He was really a good teacher, very open-minded and too good-tempered to be a harsh disciplinarian. . . ." Paula Stern Kissinger was twenty-one when Kissinger was born. She was the daughter of a middle-class German-Jewish family, a gourmet of traditional Jewish cooking, and the "practical" member of the family. The Kissingers had a second son a year later and named him Walter Bernhard Kissinger. The family lived in a five-room second-floor flat which provided Henry with books which he read and a piano which he avoided.

Henry and Wally Kissinger began their lives in a close-knit and secure world. They were able to go to school with the other children of Fürth and even joined in the local soccer matches. Reflecting on his sons at that time Louis Kissinger has recalled, "Henry was always the thinker. He was more inhibited than Wally, his brother. Wally was more the doer, more the extrovert." Of Henry, Wally has stated, "I'm sure as children we had the normal amount of sibling rivalry, but there was never the element of great competitiveness in our relationship."[84]

As a young boy in Germany Henry Kissinger was known as Heinz Kissinger. Young Kissinger did not volunteer for his first lessons in diplomacy for the persecution of the Nazis made him a reluctant student even before he had reached his teens. By the time Kissinger

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[84]Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), p. 33.

was seven, Hitler's young bullies overran the streets of his Bavarian village of Fürth, which made every Jew a target. He and his Jewish classmates were beaten up regularly. His experiences in Nazi Germany had such a lasting effect on him that Kissinger has recounted to an interviewer that even as a refugee in New York, he would cross the street whenever he saw a group of boys walking in his direction.

Kissinger's hometown of Fürth, Germany, was predominantly middle-class, educated, and comfortable. Fürth came into being about five-hundred years prior to Hitler's rule, and, ironically, as a result of the very hostility that Hitler was soon to reveal. During the fourteenth century, Jews were banned from living within the city limits and, therefore, were forced to settle in the outlying areas and begin new villages such as Fürth. By the twentieth century, Fürth had become widely known for its religious harmony and its outstanding educational standards. After Hitler finished with Fürth it was no longer recognized for either of these qualities.

By 1938, life for the Kissingers consisted of being one step ahead of the next Nazi roundup of Jews. Eventually, twelve of Kissinger's relatives were to join the six-million Jews killed by the Nazis throughout Europe. The Kissingers finally decided to flee in August of 1938, just three months before the "Crystal Night" of November 9-10, when the Hitler Youth and storm troopers went on a wild rampage against Jewish property and Jews all over Germany. Kissinger was fifteen at that time and was old enough to remember the abuse and degradation. Nevertheless, he has been consistent in

minimizing their impact on his life. He once told a German reporter, "My life in Fürth seems to have passed without leaving any lasting impressions. I can't remember any interesting or amusing moments. . . ." In other interviews he has relayed the same idea.

> That part of my childhood is not a key to anything. I was not consciously unhappy. I was not so acutely aware of what was going on. For children, these things are not that serious. It is fashionable now to explain everything psychoanalytically, but let me tell you, the political persecutions of my childhood are not what control my life.[85]

This attitude has impressed other Jewish refugees from Germany as being an exaggeration-in-reverse, designed, somehow, to exempt him from any psychological scars that might taint his diplomatic views as personal rather than pragmatic. In reality, Kissinger's feelings concerning his childhood in Germany were probably neither as strong as other refugees thought or as slight as he had indicated in his interviews with newsmen. Additionally, even though the years in Germany might have left a definite impression on Kissinger, it has probably been superseded by the many and varied experiences he has undergone in his later years.

Kissinger has always been able to find a patron at significant turning points in his life. Two of the earliest and most important of these patrons were Fritz Kraemer and William Yandell Elliott. Kraemer's influence came during World War II as a result of one of his lectures to Kissinger's unit. Elliott, as head of the government

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[85]Ibid., p. 35.

department at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, served as Kissinger's mentor during his years there. Kissinger's first exposure to Kraemer came on a Saturday morning in 1943. It was in the base auditorium that Kissinger, along with twelve-hundred other "GIs," heard Kraemer speak on why the United States was at that time engaged in the war. Kraemer, with a penchant for theatrics, spoke about the moral necessity of fighting the Nazi menace. Kissinger was impressed with Kraemer to the point of doing something he had never done before. He wrote Kraemer a fan letter expressing his admiration for how Kraemer had delivered his lecture. Unknown to Kissinger, Kraemer was just as impressed by Kissinger's note in that it was clear and concise and contained none of the frills which usually accompanied such a correspondence. Needless to say, it provided a solid basis for a new relationship between the two men.

Kraemer was an intellectual with degrees in law and philosophy which he had received in Germany before Hitler had ruled the country. Although Kraemer's influence did not have any great impact during the years of the war, its implications were to reach into the future. Kraemer himself has described his impressions of Kissinger upon their first meeting:

> I met a twenty-year old who as yet knew nothing but understood everything. He is not the usual type. He has a sixth sense of musicality--historical musicality. It was not his knowledge. He was so young. But he had the urgent desire not to understand the superficial thing, but the underlying causes. He wanted to grasp

things.[86]

Because of the overwhelming impression Kissinger made on him, Kraemer more or less took Kissinger under his wing. What Kraemer did was to try to instill in Kissinger the sense that he had a superior mind and abilities that could lead him to just about any occupation he had a mind to undertake. Kraemer himself states that he was a "psychological catalyst" and his sole purpose was to awaken Kissinger to himself and the potential he possessed for attaining a truly great intellect. Kraemer acted as a material catalyst also by agitating for his protege to be chosen for such things as the German-speaking interpreter for the commanding general of the 84th division when it was ordered to Europe. In conjunction with Kissinger's own ability, Kraemer's behind the scenes accolades were responsible for Kissinger's steady advancement while a "GI" in Germany.

As soon as Kissinger returned to the United States in the spring of 1947 he applied for admission to several colleges. Replies from these colleges told him that the enrollments for the fall semester were closed, but he was eventually accepted at Harvard in spite of its enrollment also being closed. In fact, he received a scholarship along with the GI Bill to help finance his education. Only three years later, in 1950, he received his Bachelor of Arts summa cum laude. This academic achievement produced an additional scholarship, and two

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[86]Ibid., p. 39.

years later he received his M.A., and, two years after that, his Ph.D.[87]

It was while attending Harvard that Kissinger found his second patron. As Kissinger enrolled at Harvard, William Yandell Elliott was already a legend at fifty because of his obdurate and outspoken views as a Professor of Government. Like Kraemer, Elliott had some distinction to his credit. He was an all-American tackle at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, and went on to do graduate work at Oxford University, Oxford, England, in the 1920s. During World War II he was a driving force in the Office of War Mobilization. As the world moved into the Cold War he became a passionate advocate of a tough anti-Communist approach in international affairs and a defender of the belief that America had a special role to play in a hostile world. Although he was not the most revered man on the faculty of the Government Department at Harvard, he was recognized as one of its most powerful members. Luckily for Kissinger, Elliott was sufficiently impressed with Kissinger's mental ability to make him his protege. For Elliott, Kissinger seemed more like a colleague than a student.

Kissinger's first patron, Kraemer, has paid tribute to Elliott for continuing his own effort. He stated:

> Henry is a man of absolutely unbelievable fittedness [sic]. This word is not in Webster, but you'll understand. Elliott saw it at once. He's a man who's delighted to see a student of his be

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[87] Ibid., p. 42.

> a man of excellence. Instead of pushing him down, it was Elliott who would say to people, "Look, I can't make this panel, I can't accept such and such an invitation, but I have a student . . . ." Elliott created bases for Henry from which to do other things. What I did was to evoke Henry to himself. Elliott helped Henry. That's infinitely more.[88]

The Years at Harvard: A Philosophy Develops

Elliott's contribution to Kissinger's success went beyond the realm of academics. Elliott became a friend and an inspiration and Kissinger himself has stated the influence Elliott had on him during his years at Harvard.

> We met every week for years. Bill Elliott made me discover Dostoevski and Hegel, Kant, Spinoza, and Homer. On many Sundays we took long walks in Concord. He spoke of the power of love, and said that the only truly unforgivable sin is to use people as if they were objects. He discussed greatness and excellence. And while I did not always follow his words, I knew I was in the presence of a remarkable man.[89]

In his turn, Elliott has paid tribute to Kissinger for being more than a student during his years of study at Harvard. Of Kissinger he has stated:

> He had an unusual and original mind. He had a feeling for political philosophy. He was not like the stupid behaviorists who turn everything into an either-or proposition. He was not blind to the epic nature of history. He was not blind to the Bible. He understood the foundations of history.[90]

These remarks by Elliott reveal more than his feelings toward

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[88] Ibid., p. 43.

[89] Ibid., p. 44.

[90] Ibid.

Kissinger. They also reveal the very essence of his input into Kissinger's intellectual growth and the controversy then taking place among academicians at Harvard. It was during this time that the discipline of sociology was vying for status with the long-established departments of history, government, and philosophy. Members of these established departments viewed the sociologist's behavioral approach to political science with contempt. They believed that analyzing the behavior of various world leaders, conducting so-called interview projects, and inventing a complicated new vocabulary were all cover-up for a lack of serious scholarship.

Kissinger, unlike many of his contemporaries at Harvard, was not drawn toward this new approach to studying politics, international or otherwise. It was for this reason that he joined his mentor Elliott in defending the traditional approach to learning and attacking the behavioral scientists. Harvard, with its tradition of continuity, stability, and order became Kissinger's first line of defense in holding off the forces of behavioralism. But outside of that defense barrier existed a world in the midst of uncontrolled convulsions. Communism was making inroads around the world. Examples: Stalin had sent the Red Army into Eastern Europe; Ho Chi Minh was on the move in Vietnam in a war in which Communism and nationalism would eventually defeat the French and ultimately the Americans; Mao Tse-tung raised the red flag in the Square of Heavenly Peace in Peking; and North Korea invaded South Korea. In the United States the reaction to such advances were the fanaticism of McCarthyism and appeals by men

like George C. Marshall, who helped lead the allies to victory over the Nazis and later became Secretary of State, to develop a massive economic campaign to help strengthen America's Atlantic allies. Even the most casual observer could perceive a world in the grips of revolution and change.

Many students at Harvard, protected by its ivy-covered walls, showed little concern for events which seemed so remote to them. Again, unlike many of his contemporaries at Harvard, he perceived these convulsions as a direct menace. Kissinger was not deluded by the old adage that good triumphs over evil and he found little comfort in the high-sounding phrases of the day about the "family of man" and the "indivisibility of peace." To Kissinger, the risk was too great to trust the question of survival on a mere string of slogans. This conclusion, ultimately led him to the strategy of realpolitik, a belief that power was the elemental force in history. To Kissinger, the evidence that the mere desire for peace would not bring it about was abundant. In Germany, the Jews under Hitler had no power and so six-million of them went to their deaths. In Eastern Europe, the East Europeans had no power under the Russians and they lost their freedom. The list was endless. Kissinger did not believe that power, in and of itself, was evil. In fact, the element of power was neutral and although there were many examples of power being used destructively, there were an equal number of examples where it had been used to prevent a catastrophe. The ultimate question and problem was how power was to be used.

Stating His Philosophy through His Writing

It was during his years at Harvard that Kissinger began and later refined his perceptions about the world in general and international affairs in particular. Kissinger's senior thesis is a primary source of his philosophy as it had developed when he was an undergraduate at Harvard. Kissinger wrote:

> Life is suffering, birth involves death. Transitoriness is the fate of existence. No civilization has yet been permanent, no longing completely fulfilled. This is necessity, the fatedness of history, the dilemma of mortality.[91]

Passages like this seem to reflect a vein of cynicism in Kissinger, but that is not entirely the case. What Kissinger was expressing at this time was his sense of reality in describing the events of the world. He had studied much of the historical record and was aware of the many undesirable effects which usually accompanied historical change.

> Though aging in a culture is not analogous to physical decay, it does bear a similarity to another problem of existence, the process of disenchantment. Just as the life of every person exhibits a gradual loss of wonder at the world, so history reveals an increase of familiarity with the environment, a tired groping for a certainty which will obviate all struggles, a quest for a guarantee of man's hopes in nature's mechanism.[92]

What Kissinger held in contempt most was the endless search for certainty which called for technical solutions to the profoundly

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[91]Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), pp. 6-7.

[92]Ibid., p. 7.

complex issues of human existence. Kissinger did not believe that a technical approach to the problems of life would lead to an answer for those problems. Throughout his senior thesis he wrote sarcastically of those who thought that all problems were reducible to formulas, that problems were all solvable, and that goodwill was all that was necessary to bring about peace. His feelings are revealed in passages like the following.

> But what is the greater delusion, the Golden Age or the belief in infinite material progress? As the enchantment of an inwardly remote nature is dissipated and the cold materialistic intellect replaces the sentimentality of the romantic, life emerges as but a technical problem. The frantic search for social solutions, for economic panaceas testifies to the emptiness of a soul to which necessity is an objective state, not an inward condition, and which ever believes that just a little more knowledge, just one more formula will solve the increasing bafflement of a materialistic surrounding. And it is forgotten that matter can defeat only those who have no spirituality to impart to it.[93]

Kissinger was expressing his belief that it was the "fatedness of historical events," that held the answers to the problems confronting a civilization as it continued to evolve in a changing world. Kissinger summed up his view of history, at least as he conceived it as a senior at Harvard, when he wrote:

> Is man doomed to struggle without certainty and live without assurance? In a sense that is so. Man cannot achieve a guarantee for his conduct. No technical solutions to the dilemmas of life are at hand. That is the fatedness of existence. But it also poses a challenge, an evocation of the sense of responsibility to give one's own meaning to one's life. Ethics must always reside in an inward personal state, in a personal recognition of limits.
>
> The past is dead and ruled by necessity, but freedom governs the future. . . .

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[93]Ibid.

> Life involves suffering and transitoriness. No person can choose his age or the condition of his time. The past may rob the present of much joy and much mystery. The generation of Buchenwald and the Siberian labor camps cannot talk with the same optimism as its fathers. The bliss of Dante has been lost in our civilization. But this merely describes a fact of decline and not its necessity. Man's existence is as transcendental a fact as the violence of history. Man's actions testify to his aspirations which stem from an attitude of the soul, not an evaluation of conditions. To be sure these may be tired times . . . . But we cannot require immortality as the price for giving meaning to life. The experience of freedom enables us to rise beyond the suffering of the past and the frustrations of history. In this spirituality resides humanity's essence, the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of his life, the self-transcendence which gives peace.[94]

Once Kissinger had become a graduate student he began an intensive study of international relations, for he believed that the future peace of the world and survival of the human race, lay in the relations among states. He rejected applying technical formulas to the problems of politics on any level. An alternative did exist, however, in consulting the historical record. Kissinger was acutely aware of the many vast changes which had taken place in the world since the earliest years of the nineteenth century. The advent of nuclear weapons was only one of these changes, but, he reasoned that not everything had changed in the relations between states and if the historical record were intelligently consulted--particularly with regard to successful peace negotiations--it could provide valuable insight for anyone concerned with the event of the present. To this end, Kissinger undertook writing his doctoral dissertation on the events of the early nineteenth century and how two diplomats of the

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[94]Ibid., p. 8.

day of Metternich and Castlereagh handled them.

It is important to note that Kissinger was not writing about Metternich and Castlereagh so that he might fulfill the requirement for a Ph.D. He was attempting to educate himself about the various facets of international affairs. To Kissinger, the selection of the right topic was crucial if it were to provide him with the insight he sought. Kissinger stated the importance of the subject when he wrote:

> The success of physical science depends on the selection of the "crucial" experiment; that of political science in the field of international affairs on the selection of the "crucial" period. I have chosen for my topic the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I am frank to say, because its problems seem analogous to those of our day. But I do not insist on this analogy.[95]

The work was published in 1957 as: A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822. Kissinger's work focused on the diplomatic efforts in 1814 and 1815 to restore order in Europe after twenty-five years of war and revolution. According to Kissinger, the most significant event of the period came with Napoleon's defeat in Russia during the winter of 1812. It was significant because it was at this time that it became evident that Europe was not to be organized by force.

After Napoleon's defeat, the victors met in Vienna. The settlement that was reached was largely the work of two unusual diplomats. They were Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, and Prince Metternich, his Austrian host. Of these two men Kissinger

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[95]Ibid., p. 10.

wrote:

> What is surprising is not how imperfect was the settlement that emerged, but how sane, not how "reactionary," according to the self-righteous doctrines of nineteenth century histiography, but how balanced. It may not have fulfilled all the hopes of an idealistic generation, but it gave this generation something perhaps more precious: a period of stability which permitted their hopes to be realized without a major war or a permanent revolution.[96]

What they had accomplished, according to Kissinger, was to create a balance of power. That is to say that they created a situation where it was in no country's interest to escalate a war to the point of upsetting the carefully balanced structure and each country had a vested interest in stability. This "balance" was as close to peace as mankind could come and while it was not perfect, it offered the best opportunity for survival.

Kissinger went on to explain how Metternich and Castlereagh brought this tenuous balance about. He believed that Metternich and Castlereagh had to use cunning and patience, and had to be able to manipulate events and people. They had to play the power game in total secrecy, unconstrained by parliaments and popular opinion, which many times lacked the knowledge and temperament for diplomacy. They had to be able to deal with as many allies as possible. They could not be afraid to use force when it became necessary to maintain order. They could not be dominated by ironclad rules of conduct and they used occadional shows of what Kissinger refers to as "credible

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[96]Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, p. 47.

irrationality" in order to make a point. They could not shy away from duplicity, cynicism, or unscrupulousness, because each was an acceptable tool for statecraft. They could never alienate a potential ally and they always had to be charming, clever, and visible. According to Kissinger, Metternich, until 1848, and then Bismarck, later in the century, played the game with extraordinary skill. They avoided major crises by virtue of their sillful balancing acts while never allowing sentiment to interfere with the necessities of policy. In the final analysis, they were always ready to sacrifice the form of a settlement for its substance.

It was from this analysis that Kissinger developed many of the ideas that would later become identifiable in his diplomacy. From his analysis, Kissinger concluded that it was conservatism in constant conflict with revolution which produced the high risk of violence in the world. The aim of any foreign policy should be to establish a structure of international order to peacefully deal with and mediate between these conflicting forces. A successful strategy, he felt, was the skillful use of a balance of competing powers along with secret negotiations and the unbridled readiness to use military force if required.

Kissinger was to learn many things which had some degree of relevance to the contemporary world. In exploring the possibilities of a peaceful international environment, Kissinger was persuaded that peace could not become the primary objective of foreign policy, but rather that it was the bonus that followed from an intelligently

conceived and executed policy. It is for that reason that he opened his dissertation with the observation that ". . . those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace." Kissinger believed that in any international system which sought peace as its primary objective, every state in that system was at the mercy of the most ruthless, because its tendency would be to mollify the most aggressive state for the sake of peace and accept its demands, even if they were unreasonable. To Kissinger, such a situation could only produce massive instability and insecurity.

According to Kissinger, the first priority of an international system was to attain stability. The problem arose in trying to devise methods to achieve it.

> Stability has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. "Legitimacy" as here used should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy. A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought <u>in the name of</u> the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expression of the "legitimate," general consensus. Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiation, is possible only in "legitimate" international orders.[97]

The implications for the nature of the system concerning this conclusion were profound. For example, Kissinger defined

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[97]Henry A. Kissinger, <u>A World Restored: Europe after Napoleon</u> (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), pp. 1-2.

diplomacy as "the adjustment of differences through negotiation." In those states which accepted a particular international order as legitimate, it was to their benefit to negotiate their differences. However, when a state maintained that the international order was illegitimate, diplomacy was no longer productive. A state undertaking such action has to be considered revolutionary because it challenges the established international order and presses for the existing order to be replaced by one which it considers legitimate. The solution, according to Kissinger, was to solve international conflicts within the existing international order. While the solution of these conflicts may not be able to avoid war, the likelihood of bringing about peace after such a war is much greater if the existing international order is preserved.

Kissinger was not merely writing on a theoretical plane when he considered the problems that confronted European statesmen in the early nineteenth century; he was, in fact, trying to determine and study the composition of the international system as it existed in the midst of the twentieth century. One of the greatest dilemmas confronting Kissinger was whether the Soviet Union should be viewed as a "revolutionary" power. Kissinger felt it imperative to know whether the Soviet Union accepted the system which then existed or whether it hoped to replace it. He paid little credence to those who argued that the Russians, because of their tragic past, had a legitimate reason to be dissatisfied with their security in the current system. Kissinger understood that feelings of insecurity were

inevitable in any international system made up of independent states, but what upset him was the refusal of some states to be reassured. These states wanted what it was impossible to have, absolute security. For, if their demands were to be met, every other state in the system would be absolutely insecure.

Another harmful side effect of having an international system which harbored a "revolutionary" state was that negotiation was impossible. Although diplomats might meet, there was little likelihood of a meaningful agreement because they would, in effect, be speaking different languages. The primary difficulty arose, however, from the fact that nonrevolutionary states preferred to believe that they could get along with "revolutionary" states. According to Kissinger, nonrevolutionary states refused to believe that other states could have objectives that were "unlimited" and "nonnegotiable." In refusing to face the reality of a "revolutionary" power within a system, the nonrevolutionary states were contributing to the creation of an arms race or a war within that system.

The way to avoid such an arms race or a war was to create and build a system based on "legitimacy." According to Kissinger, this was the aim of the Congress of Vienna.

> The issue at Vienna, then, was not reform against reaction--this is the interpretation of posterity. Instead, the problem was to create an order in which change could be brought about through a sense of obligation, instead of through an assertion of power. For the difference between a revolutionary order and a <u>healthy</u> legitimate one is not the possibility of change, but the mode of its accomplishment. A "legitimate" order, as long as it is not stagnant, achieves its transformation through acceptance, and this presupposes a consensus on the nature of a just arrangement. But

> a revolutionary order having destroyed the existing structure of obligations, must impose its measures by force and the Reign of Terror of any revolution is inevitably an almost exact reflection of its success in sweeping away the prevailing legitimacy. A "legitimate" order limits the possible by the just; a revolutionary order identifies the just with the physically possible. A legitimate order confronts the problem of creating a structure which does not make change impossible; a revolutionary order faces the dilemma that change may become an end in itself and thus make the establishment of any structure impossible. In neither case is reform carried out through a sudden act of insight; this is the illusion of Utopians. Nor is it impossible to construct an order which will have no defenders of the status quo or no reformers, and the attempt to do so leads either to the frenzy of the totalitarian state or to stagnation. The health of a social structure is its ability to translate transformation into acceptance, to relate the forces of change to those of conservation. The statesmen at Vienna had experienced an effort to establish this relation by force; it was not strange that they attempted to construct an alternative based on "legitimacy."[98]

As Kissinger looked at the European continent and its domination by Napoleon in 1812, he was aware that the concept of legitimacy was lacking but knew that the survival of the Napoleonic Empire was in no way guaranteed. Kissinger explained that Napoleon's success was dependent upon his ability to militarily defeat the peoples of Europe and would last only as long as they accepted that defeat as final. Because of the immense difficulty in maintaining an international system by sheer force, Kissinger believed that it was never very likely that Europe would permit itself to be organized by that force. It was only when men like Metternich and Castlereagh, who understood the principles of international affairs and diplomacy, came along that the new European equilibrium could be created. However, Kissinger

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[98]Ibid., pp. 172-73.

knew that these men were not simply creating this equilibrium out of the goodness of their hearts. Such an achievement was not only dependent on the intuitive power of these men but they had to be considered in the light of the requirements of their own countries. For those requirements were not the same. As in any arrangement involving two or more participants, divergent needs existed and ways had to be found to compromise those needs. Austria and Great Britain were very different states having very different needs and it was because of this difference that Kissinger developed another of his fundamental distinctions. The distinction was between what he called an "island" power and a "continental" power.

Great Britain was the island power; Austria was the continental power. Kissinger made the distinction not only in terms of geography, but also in terms of the very different ways that each perceived foreign policy issues. Although his dissertation appeared only to speak of the events of the nineteenth century, there was a clear implication that the United States played the role of the island power. With the United States straddled by two oceans, its definition of security had to differ from that of a continental power. This was the case in the nineteenth century. Metternich and Castlereagh could never achieve a complete meeting of the minds because of their fundamentally incompatible interests. It was impossible to imagine either one liberating himself sufficiently of his preconceptions to adopt those of the other. But, as long as each could compromise on those issues which would help maintain a legitimate international order, it

cannot be said that it was necessary for them to adopt the other's perceptions in order to contribute to the creation of a stable international order.

It was during the time that Kissinger was writing his dissertation, in 1952, that Elliott put him in charge of a new program that was to provide him with an impressive network of contacts throughout the world. The program was called the Harvard International Seminar, and it brought together about thirty-five intelligent and influential foreigners to spend each summer at Harvard discussing politics, philosophy, and history. After several years as head of this program, Kissinger had come in contact with hundreds of prospective politicians, scholars, and journalists, who would always remember him for a stimulating summer in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

At its inception, the seminar was a product of the Cold War. Like other organizations at that time, for example, the National Student Association, it was subsidized to some degree by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), which used such foundations for channeling funds in order to avoid detection. In this way, the CIA used scholars and universities in fighting Communism. Regardless of the CIA involvement, Kissinger never recruited a Communist for the seminar for he accepted, with Elliott, the worldwide struggle against Communism as a primary responsibility. This attitude by Kissinger was amply demonstrated by him as editor of the seminar's quarterly, Confluence: An International Forum, which had a distinct anti-Communist outlook.

Kissinger's participation in the seminar was only one example of his entry into the world of power, politics, and diplomacy beyond Harvard. It was his emergence as a hardliner in the early 1950s which made his admission to Washington's power center that much easier. Having only received his B.A., he became a consultant of the Army's Operations Research Office. In 1951, he was sent to South Korea by the Army to study the effects of military occupation upon the Korean people. By the time he received his M.A. in 1952, he was making regular trips to Washington performing such tasks as being a consultant to the Psychological Strategy Board of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As in World War II with Kraemer, Kissinger, with some behind the scenes promotion by Elliott plus his own proven ability, had been placed on the first rungs of his ascent to power.

The Council on Foreign Relations: Another Rung to Power

In 1955, a new association, of a very different kind, became important to Kissinger. An organization called the Council on Foreign Relations was founded in 1954, composed of a panel of exceptionally qualified individuals, to explore all factors which were involved in the making and implementing of foreign policy in the nuclear age. Gordon Dean, as the chairman of the group, asked Kissinger to join the group as its study director. The request was probably the most important event in Kissinger's adult life, second only to his decision to study at Harvard. For not only did it provide Kissinger with the many contacts he would later utilize in the

government, but it also gave him the opportunity to write a book entitled Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. The book not only enabled him to refine and shape what he thought were the successful elements of a foreign policy, but it also provided a larger forum for him to express his thoughts.

Kissinger wrote Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy for a very select group made up of those who held responsible positions in the United States at the highest governmental levels. Kissinger opened his book by echoing much of what he had said in his dissertation. He began by referring to Nemesis, the goddess of fate, who sometimes punished man by completely fulfilling his wishes. Kissinger was referring, of course, to the superabundance of physical power which man had obtained in developing the atomic bomb. The problem in the past had always been how to increase the amount of physical power available to a country. With the advent of nuclear weapons, man now had an excess of power which had to be used with subtlety and discretion or the world could end up being destroyed by them.

Kissinger then went on to discuss the irony of history and the implications it held for the world in the nuclear age. According to Kissinger, the ultimate aim of a country was the acquisition of additional power. Throughout history military power was considered the final resource. Before nuclear weapons, it was inconceivable that a country could possess too much strength for political use for it was thought that the more powerful a country the more politically

effective. The minimum amount of power acceptable was that amount which assured the impermeability of the territory from attack. Until the Second World War, a nation's strength was measured by its ability to protect its population from direct attack. The nuclear age has destroyed this traditional yardstick. An increase in strength no longer necessarily meant that a population was protected. Because of the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, no force level can prevent levels of damage that are unacceptable to any nation. Because of this development, the dilemma arises of how to discipline power so that it bears a rational relationship to the political objectives of a country. According to Kissinger, the paradox of contemporary military strength is that any substantial increase in power usually bears no relationship to policy. Because the major nuclear powers have the capability of devastating each other, they have great difficulty in relating this capability to policy except in preventing direct challenges to their own survival. This capacity to destroy was even more difficult to relate in policy toward countries with no capacity for retaliation. Kissinger pointed this fact out by stating that although the margin of superiority of the nuclear powers over other states had widened since World War II, the other states were able to pursue their own policies without consultation with the superpowers. He pointed out that the sanctions used toward the less developed countries in the past were no longer effective in the nuclear age. An all-out nuclear response was an excessive and possibly the most erroneous response to minor threats to the national interest. In

other words, power no longer translated into influence. He did not mean that impotence increased influence, but rather that power did not necessarily confer it.

What the United States required was a strategic doctrine which related to its defense needs. According to Kissinger, the first thing which had to be understood was what constituted a threat to American security. In the traditional concept of aggression, Americans usually envisioned rapidly moving armies encroaching on national frontiers. Kissinger wrote that this type of aggression was not likely to occur in the nuclear age. The second requirement American policy-makers would have to meet was that of revising what constituted a significant gain of national power by another country. In the nuclear age, the gains in power which a country obtained were usually contained within its borders. The emphasis had moved from gaining power through territorial expansion to gaining power through technological change, with the usual result being an arms race. The primary concern for Kissinger, lay not in the power of weapons, but in his skepticism about the American capacity to respond to the political and psychological challenge that they posed. Kissinger wrote, "The nuclear age is the age of internal subversion, of intervention by 'volunteers,' of domination through political and psychological warfare. . . ."[99] He felt that the past historical experiences of the United States prevented it from being able to cope with this new and

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[99]Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), p. 67.

dangerous world. Americans were accustomed to facing unambiguous threats and it is for this reason that the concept of all-out war was invented to meet overt aggression. Kissinger pointed out the fallacy in such a policy when he reasoned that there was no reason to expect the Russians to accommodate the Americans by using overt methods in achieving their policy objectives. While the Americans were waiting for the Russians to make an unambiguous and aggressive military move the Russians could be achieving their objectives through other clandestine operations.

Kissinger felt the United States extremely vulnerable to both Soviet maneuvers and propaganda. Without an all-out Communist attack, American leaders tended to believe that Soviet animosity stemmed either from their having totally misunderstood American policy or from malevolent individuals or groups within the Soviet hierarchy. Kissinger felt there was a distinct American disadvantage in not believing that Soviet policies were calculated and deliberate. By constantly searching for "reasonable motives" to explain what would otherwise appear as irrational acts by the Soviet Union, they were lulling themselves into a false sense of security. Soviet propaganda was made even more effective by those who wished to put the best possible motives behind Soviet policies. Slogans like "peaceful coexistence" were ingenious and precisely attuned to the needs and feelings of the time. Such maneuvers by the Russians helped in consoling those who refused to believe that radical changes were occuring in the world. Kissinger was irritated by Americans who were always

searching for evidence of a "shift" in Russian policies and, even when they found none, chose to remain silent. Many even argued that the nuclear stalemate had been produced by the Russians' ability to develop a long-range delivery system for thermonuclear weapons. Kissinger felt this to be a very simplistic and erroneous view. The stalemate, in Kissinger's mind, began the day the United States exploded its first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. Kissinger believed that the United States had missed the opportunity to translate its military superiority into a political advantage when it enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. He insisted that the United States never correctly perceived the advantages that atomic weapons gave. Because the United States had held to its outdated notion of total victory, and felt indebted to the Russians for what they had done in resisting Hitler, it was rendered impotent by both strategic and humanitarian considerations. The years of atomic monopoly were wasted. Kissinger was not even convinced, as were most other Americans, that the American "bomb" had kept the Russians from taking over the whole of Europe. Kissinger believed that it was only the tremendous losses suffered during the war that made it physically impossible for the Russians to undertake new military ventures. Regardless of whether or not the American atomic monopoly had some effect in preventing a greater expansion of Soviet power, the thing which impressed Kissinger the most was that, even during the period when the American monopoly was total, the Soviets managed to consolidate their control in Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communists were able to take over mainland China, and the

Russians were able to develop their own nuclear capability.[100]

Kissinger summed up his feelings about the nuclear issue when he wrote: "Given the power of modern weapons, it should be the task of our strategic doctrine to create alternatives less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear holocaust. . . ."[101] Kissinger believed that a faulty strategic doctrine was at the roots of inhibited and faulty actions by policy-makers. As a student of history, he was well aware of the example provided by the French in the 1930s. According to Kissinger, it was because the French General Staff had greatly exaggerated the military capabilities of the Germans that they developed a military doctrine based on two false premises. First, was the premise that only all-out war was possible. Second, was that France could only win such a war by staying on the defensive. The subsequent construction of a vast network of fortresses known as the Maginot Line, became the principal object of military policy and probably contributed more to France's defeat at the hands of the Germans than any other single factor. Kissinger felt that France's doctrinal rigidity had led to its military catastrophe. By extension, he felt the United States faced the same dilemma. It could not go on with a doctrine that was predicated on all-out war during the nuclear age. What was necessary, according to Kissinger, was a doctrine which provided the maximum room for diplomacy and that realized

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[100]Ibid., pp. 67-68.

[101]Ibid., p. 69.

the atomic age not only provided risks but also opportunities.

Implications for the Balance of Power and Alliances

International relations theory, as it was described in Kissinger's early writings, considered the "balance of power" and "alliances" as two other important elements along with "nuclear weapons." In discussing the balance of power he pointed out the difference between the traditional concept of the term and what it had come to mean in the nuclear age. According to Kissinger, the traditional considerations for the balance of power were territorial. That is to say, before nuclear weapons, a state gained overwhelming superiority only by conquest over other states. Hence, the reasoning that as long as territorial expansion was foreclosed, or severely limited, the stability or equilibrium of the system was likely to be preserved. In the nuclear age, this is no longer true. Kissinger believed that few conquests of territory in the nuclear age added to the effective military strength of the conquerer. What he meant was that such conquests were unnecessary because major increases in power were possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state. As examples of such gains he wrote that China gained more in real military power through its acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia. He felt the same was true for Russia with respect to all of Europe. The really fundamental changes in the balance of power system have all occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states, and as a

result of this and other changes, such as political multipolarity, there has been a concurrent transformation in the nature of our alliance system.

Kissinger has written that alliances can only be effective if they meet four conditions:

> . . . 1. A common objective--usually defense against a common danger.
> 2. A degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the causes of a war.
> 3. Some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon.
> 4. A penalty for noncooperation--that is the possibility of being refused assistance must exist--otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down.[102]

Apart from NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), none of the alliances developed by the United States have met these conditions. Although the United States belongs to a myriad of other treaty organizations such as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Treaty), and the OAS (Organization of American States), Kissinger saw them as token arrangements lacking any concrete consensus as to the danger confronting each member. Kissinger attributed the laxity of these agreements to a clear lack of the perception of common interests within each alliance system. The members of these alliances have never been able to develop common policies with respect to the issues of war and peace. In addition, most of America's allies

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[102] Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 65-66.

have neither the resources nor the will to render mutual support. NATO, he explains, is the exception because the United States is there united with countries of similar traditions and domestic structures. From the beginning, there was a common conception of the threat and the technical means for cooperation existed. It was for these reasons that NATO was a dynamic and creative institution during the first two decades subsequent to World War II.

Kissinger, however, has begun to have misgivings about the future well-being of NATO. He identifies two causes. The first is some actions by the United States, especially its frequent unilateral changes of policy. The second, and probably the most important, has been the transformation of the international environment. He has specifically expressed his worry over the decline in the preeminence of the superpowers and the emergence of political multipolarity. Where the alliances outside of Europe failed to take into account the military bipolarity of the fifties, NATO has failed to adjust to the political multipolarity of the sixties and seventies. In other words, because of the easing of tensions between the nuclear superpowers, NATO is under the delusion that it no longer has a common ground or threat to sanction its working together to solve international problems such as collective defense. Kissinger, like Acheson and Dulles before him, still holds the belief that Europe is central to bringing about a stable world order and he believes that the present world situation is especially conducive to strengthening the existing ties among the NATO nations. Because all modern nations

face the problems of pollution, bureaucratization, environmental control, urban growth, and others, Kissinger believes that a community of interests can be developed in both the social and political realms. If the nations of the Atlantic community can work together on these issues and others, either through private or governmental channels or both, then perhaps a new generation habituated to cooperative efforts might develop similar to that spawned in the circumstances surrounding the Marshall Plan.

Kissinger in Washington: An Application of Theory

Henry Kissinger was an outspoken critic of American foreign policy before he reached the White House. He criticized objectives, found fault with operating procedures, and constantly complained of the absence of subtlety and nuance in American foreign affairs. In his view, American foreign policy was crisis-oriented. It was only when a disaster threatened that resources were mobilized and it was a rare occasion when the American government anticipated events. Even during those times when the United States had claimed to have something of a "philosophy" underpinning its far-flung foreign policy objectives, it was generally flawed, antiquated, irrelevent, or simply inappropriate. Kissinger could find very few instances in the years after World War II when he felt American leaders had performed at a level adequate to the challenges of the international system. He felt that too few of those who conducted American foreign policy had any feelings for its nuance or appreciated its intellectual

character.

While Kissinger was a fairly conspicuous and influential aide during his first few years in the White House, he had not become the subject of daily newspaper articles. His visibility was increased with the events and disclosures occurring during the years of 1971 and 1972 when the negotiations in Vietnam seemed to finally be paying off. People began to wonder exactly how much influence Kissinger had on the President. There were consistent efforts to try to distinguish between policies that were assumed to be Kissinger's and those that could reasonably be attributed to President Nixon. However, all such theorizing did little in answering the most important question concerning Kissinger's connection with American foreign policy. That is, was foreign policy under Richard Nixon shaped by theories and influenced by operational procedures that had been proposed by Kissinger in his many writings before he assumed his position in the government?

In answering this question, the evidence suggests that the answer is a very definite yes. The foreign policy strategies and statements of the Nixon and Nixon-Ford Administrations replicate or approximate the procedures and policies recommended by Kissinger in all his published writings. It was in conjunction with President Nixon who, like Kissinger, insisted on the centrality of philosophy and the importance of doctrine, that Kissinger demonstrated his characteristic pragmatism. In each of his annual reports to Congress, largely prepared by Kissinger, Nixon emphasized his desire to implement what, in 1972, he called "the philosophy of a new American

foreign policy." Nixon, like Kissinger, felt it imperative to distinguish between those premises which were once sufficient in foreign affairs and those that were necessary for the present and the future. When Richard Nixon became President, the nation was preoccupied with the war in Vietnam. No other foreign policy issue captivated the interest of the country. Kissinger's own theoretical framework made it impossible for him to view the conflict in the way that the majority of the country and the news media did. The United States, in his system, was a major world power and it could not afford to become preoccupied with any single issue to the exclusion of all others. He expressed this belief in a speech entitled "A New National Partnership," given in Los Angeles on January 24, 1975.

In his speech Kissinger states that the three decades of the Cold War have produced American foreign policies which, for the most part, have been successful. But he quickly goes on to warn that the international patterns of the past are crumbling and the policies designed to meet such patterns are no longer relevent in the present multipolar, interdependent international environment. For the United States, he stresses that participation in the international environment is no longer a choice but a prerequisite for world stability. It is an expression of the reality which has been brought to bear in the last thirty years with nuclear weapons which can span continents in minutes and with an economy whose prosperity is so closely linked with those of other peoples and countries. And while the present international situation, with all its instability and dislocations,

presents the possibility of unprecedented chaos, it also presents the possibility of unprecedented creativity. The crucial realization for all nations of the world is that they are all dependent, one on the other, to some degree. For the future, interdependence can either foster common progress or common disaster.[103]

Kissinger, in everything that he has ever written about contemporary foreign policy, shows a persistent interest in five constituent elements: the arms equation; the condition of the Communist bloc; the state of America's alliances; the plight of the developing countries; and America's internal domestic strengths and weaknesses. On May 12, 1975, before the St. Louis World Affairs Council, St. Louis, Missouri, Kissinger delivered a speech, "The Challenge of Peace," in which he discusses these five elements in detail.

In discussing the arms equation Kissinger states that the security of a nation depends upon the strategic forces which can deter attack and, if need be, ensure swift retaliation should aggression occur. The crucial factor is maintaining a strategic balance with our adversaries like the Soviet Union. Kissinger suggests that the balance can be maintained by the United States by not allowing unilateral decisions or a buildup by the other side to occur. The balance is also dependent on preventing onesided agreements or violations of agreements. Above all, however, it must be understood what maintaining

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[103]Henry A. Kissinger, "A New National Partnership, Secretary of State" [address given in Los Angeles, January 24, 1975]. [Press Release.]

the balance means. Kissinger warns that strategic parity is a term difficult to define and it is easy to mistakenly create "gaps" which do not exist. He stresses the importance for the American people to realize the fact that American strategic forces are designed and implemented according to different criteria from those of the Soviet Union and they must be judged in the light of our strategic needs and not theirs.

In discussing the condition of the Communist bloc and detente Kissinger states that the transitional state of the world makes it necessary for the United States to deal with adversaries as well as allies. In other words, it is no longer possible to deal solely with our allies while admonishing our adversaries or deal with adversaries while ignoring allies as was once the practice at an earlier point in the Cold War. The United States must deal with both in a concerted effort to reduce tensions and provide incentives for an ultimate settlement.

In discussing the state of America's alliances Kissinger states that they stand as the cornerstone of international peace and stability. Particularly important are the arrangements with the industrial democracies of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan because of the common conceptions of the "dignity of man" and interest in "peace and prosperity." Kissinger stresses the fact that alliances were originally formed in response to a military threat. But today they must extend across a broader spectrum of challenges because of the progressive interdependence of the nations of the world. The

greatest hope for progress in solving the many problems confronting the world, both domestically and internationally, lies in cooperative arrangements between countries which allow for the maximum resources to be brought to bear on the critical problems of today.

In discussing the plight of the developing countries Kissinger states that American policy has been, and will continue to be, consistent in supporting the aspirations of these countries in the area of decolonization and independence. Again, the conviction that interdependence links the United States with the rest of the world makes the weakest country, as well as the strongest, an important factor in achieving peace and stability in the international system.

In discussing America's internal domestic strengths and weaknesses he states that the United States, when unified in pursuing a goal, is capable of achieving that goal. But the recent developments of the Vietnam War have greatly undermined that unity and subsequently undermined American foreign policy. Kissinger is convinced that the United States, and the world, are at the juncture of great opportunities in the area of international relations. The greatest obstacle to success, however, is not resistance from abroad but division within our own borders. Although Vietnam was an unfortunate situation, it should not be used as a wedge in dividing the nation on a cohesive and constructive foreign policy for the future. Such division can only mire American foreign policy immobile, adding to the doubts of American allies and tempting American adversaries to take chances with

the peace of the world.[104]

Policy, in Kissinger's mind, depended on conjectures being made about the opportunities offered by all of these. Kissinger's object was to secure a stable international order. The necessary pre-condition of any peace was a stable international order. While Kissinger was under no illusions as to the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, he did believe that diplomacy properly conceived could be educational. He did not pretend that issues which have divided the two countries for over twenty years would suddenly disappear because of his policies or those of a new generation of leaders in the Kremlin. He was not preoccupied with negotiating technique at the expense of negotiating objectives of substance. Kissinger believed that statesmanship had a place in twentieth-century international relations. He had learned when writing his dissertation, that the statesman's talents were primarily psychological. Some of those talents were knowing how to judge the objectives of societies different from his own; able to estimate the relationship of forces correctly; having a vision and knowing how to translate that vision into reality; and finally being able to make his ideas credible to his own people for his failure to communicate his principles to others in states both hostile or neutral to his own, would defeat him and his policies.

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[104]Henry A. Kissinger, "The Challenge of Peace, Secretary of State" [address given before the St. Louis World Affairs Council, St. Louis, Missouri, May 12, 1975]. [Press Release.]

No one realized the difficulty of being a statesman more than Kissinger. Additionally, a statesman had to be aware of history, which meant more than simply knowing history. He had to know the limits of the perceptions of others, understanding the difficulty other societies face when trying to view problems from a perspective gained merely from past experiences. According to Kissinger, it was important that a statesman not become a prophet through his style of policy. Kissinger believed that there were two basic policy styles which he defines as the "political" as against the "revolutionary" approach to order, or reduced to personalities, as the distinction between the "statesman" and the "prophet."

> The statesman manipulates reality; his first goal is survival; he feels responsible not only for the best but also for the worst conceivable outcome. His view of human nature is wary. . . . He will try to avoid certain experiments, not because he would object to the results if they succeeded, but because he would feel himself responsible for the consequences if they failed. He is suspicious of those who personalize foreign policy, for history teaches him the fragility of structures dependent on individuals. To the statesman, gradualism is the essence of stability; he represents an era of average performance, of gradual change and slow construction.
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> By contrast, the prophet is less concerned with manipulating than with creating reality. What is possible interests him less than what is "right." He offers his vision as the test and his good faith as a guarantee. He believes in total solutions; he is less absorbed in methodology than in purpose. He believes in the perfectibility of man. His approach is timeless and not dependent on circumstances. He objects to gradualism as an unnecessary concession to circumstance. He will risk everything because his vision is the primary significant reality to him. Paradoxically, his more optimistic view of human nature makes him more intolerant than the statesman. If truth is both knowable and attainable, only immortality or stupidity can keep man from realizing it. The prophet represents an era of exaltation, of great upheavals, of

vast accomplishments, but also of enormous disasters.[105]

Kissinger was not looking for heroes but for principles that would make it possible for states to avoid the terrors of nuclear war in the twentieth century. In a general analysis of the dilemma confronting the statesman of the twentieth century, Kissinger has stated:

> Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are usually irretrievable. New relationships in a fluid transitional period--such as today--are delicate and vulnerable; they must be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still there or whether there is some marginally better location for them. We are not at a time of tenuous beginnings. Western Europe and Japan have joined us in an effort to reinvigorate our relationships. The Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy--at least partially--as a relationship between states rather than as an international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries are impatient for economic and social change. A new dimension of unprecedented challenges--in food, oceans, energy, environment--demands global cooperation. We are at one of those rare moments where through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design, man seems in a position to shape his future. What we need is the confidence to discuss issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define together the nature of our world as well as the vision to chart together a more just future.[106]

Kissinger, throughout his writings and speeches over the last twenty-five years, has been speaking to three communities--the Soviet Union, the domestic American, and America's allies. He has asked each to be reasonable in realizing that peace cannot be secured by irresponsibility, rhetoric, or by avoiding certain realities. Although there seems to be three distinct messages, in effect there is only one. How

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[105]Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, pp. 46-47.

[106]Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, p. 291.

well this message has been received can only be judged in the light of history.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Before concluding this thesis by comparing in detail the perceptions of these three men and the resultant foreign policies, it should first be discussed what has been attempted up to this point:

First, the writer attempted to emphasize the importance of the time period in which these men have served as Secretary of State. The period is significant for it, probably more than any other single factor, links them for the purpose of this study. Each has served as Secretary during the crucial period since World War II known as the Cold War Era; a period which has seen the United States and its allies, adhering to the system of democracy, engaged in a military and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies, adhering to the system of communism. Adding to the complexity of this adversary relationship has been the development of nuclear weapons, another biproduct of World War II and probably the single-most complicating element of international relations in the twentieth century. Needless to say, the problems and difficulties of being Secretary of State during such a fluid and transitional period of history have increased proportionately. That is to say, each of these men has had to deal in an international environment which is distinct from any period prior to World War II. In this respect, they are members of a unique group

of foreign policy-makers.

Second, and at least as important as the general Cold War period in which each served, is the particular time during this period when each served as Secretary of State. Acheson became Secretary in 1949. This was only three years after World War II and, considering his influence on American foreign policy at this time, it is reasonable to call him one of the original architects of American Cold War Policy. Following Acheson was Dulles, who became Secretary in 1953. Together these two men held the office for more than a decade (1948 to 1959). These were probably the most crucial years of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War for they set the tone for the years that were to follow. It was during these first crucial years that the American "Cold War" policy was created which served as the general blueprint, followed pretty much without variance until the emergence of Henry Kissinger in 1968. Kissinger is the first Secretary to really depart from the basic policies of "containment" and "massive retaliation" as they were advocated by Acheson and Dulles at the beginning of the Cold War era. Kissinger, by advocating detente and an easing of tensions between the superpowers, has set a new trend in the field of international relations and may have even begun a new era. Kissinger has made significant gains in the quest for a more stable and peaceful international environment. Some examples are his negotiating the end of the Vietnam War--for which he and Le Duc Tho received the Nobel Peace Prize, agreements on the limiting of strategic nuclear arms (SALT--Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), his shuttle diplomacy in the

Middle East which helped keep the lid on the pressure cooker of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and opening the way for increased cultural and business exchanges between the United States and Russia and the United States and China. This is not to say that Kissinger's policies have been more successful than either Acheson's or Dulles'. The purpose of this study is not to determine the success or failure, effectiveness or ineffectiveness, rightness or wrongness of their perceptions or the policies that followed from those perceptions. The purpose is to show that each man, in his own way, has contributed significantly in formulating and executing American foreign policy during an extremely critical period of history.

Last, the attempt was made to show the process by which each man's beliefs and perceptions were developed over various periods in their lives. In the case of each the writer attempted to trace this development from the earliest time in each man's life that may have had some impact on his later and more developed perceptions as Secretary of State. In all three cases the influence of their family and home life was discussed. Acheson and Dulles were both sons of Protestant ministers and each had been substantially influenced by his father's devotion to religion. Dulles went so far as to bring his religious convictions to the Secretaryship and in some instances tried to use them as a justification for many of his proposed policies. In the case of Kissinger, growing up in Nazi Germany as a Jew may have implications for his perceptions of life in general and international relations in particular. Nevertheless, the writer concentrated on the

period in which Kissinger was at Harvard, both as a student and professor. It was at this time that his perceptions took form and substance. This study is by no means the most comprehensive or exhaustive examination of all the factors contributing to the perceptions of these men. However, the attempt was made to construct a "framework" of the relevant beliefs and perceptions of each man as has been expressed in his own writings and the writings of others. In the end the writer hopes to illustrate how these perceptions have been decisive in the foreign policy decisions of each man as Secretary of State.

In concluding this thesis it is attempted to draw together the various elements comprising each man as an individual personality. In the final analysis the writer hopes to provide a composite of each man by analyzing and contrasting what he considers to be the salient elements making up each man's perceptions in key subject areas of foreign policy and international affairs. The key areas are the Role of Power, the Communist Threat, the Balance of Power, Collective Security, World Government, the Role of Morality, the Character of the International System, and the Creativity of Distortion or Perceptions.

Contrast in Perceptions: A Final Analysis

The role of power

Hans Morganthau [Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967)] is the foremost contemporary advocate of the concept of

power as the theoretical core of international politics. In his view, all politics are a struggle for power. But what is power? For the purpose of this analysis, the concept of power can be broken into three separate elements: power is

1. the act (process, relationship) of influencing other factors;

2. it includes the capabilities used to make the wielding of influence successful; and

3. the responses to the act.

However, since this definition may seem too abstract, the concept can be defined in the more operational terms of policy-makers. In formulating policy and the strategy to achieve certain goals, they explicitly or implicitly consider four questions:

> . . . 1) Given our goals, what do we wish B to do or not to do? (X)
> 2) How shall we get B to do or not do X? (implies a relationship and process)
> 3) What capabilities are at our disposal so that we can induce B to do or not do X?
> 4) What is B's probable response to our attempts to influence its behavior?

A model illustrating this phenomenon for state "A" is as follows:



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Each man has seen power as one of the most fundamental elements in carrying out a foreign policy. That is to say, they all have considered the use of power, military, political, economic, or otherwise, as an undeniable and inseparable element of any foreign policy which hopes to be at all successful. From their own writings it is evident that they felt a foreign policy would, in the end, prove fruitless if it did not contain a formidable and credible power element. It can be said, then, that Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger have agreed on the necessity of power in carrying out foreign policy. But have they, as each has come to be Secretary of State, been in as much agreement on how the power element was to be utilized in the foreign policy-making process?

To Acheson, American power lay primarily in its ability to deter a nuclear attack by the Russians. The Russian threat and the possibility of a Soviet nuclear first strike preoccupied him as Secretary of State. In his book Power and Diplomacy he states:

The object of military and political policy is to magnify the

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[107] K. J. Holsti, "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations," Politics and the International System, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), pp. 183-85.

> already formidable difficulties in the way of a nuclear attack upon us, so that the risks of the enterprise may continually and, if possible, increasingly outweigh the potential gains. . . .[108]

Out of this general statement on policy came the specific policy during his tenure as Secretary of State known as "containment." Actually a tripartite policy, it consisted of a strong Western European Community, a politically cohesive Atlantic community, and, above all, military power placed around the periphery of Communist Europe and Asia. In this way he hoped to dam up the impending flow of Communism into the rest of the free world by accumulating a preponderance of power against which the Soviet Union would not dare launch a first strike. Once again, from his book Power and Diplomacy he stated: "The growth of Soviet power requires the growth of a counter-power among those nations which are not willing to concede Soviet hegemony. . . ."[109]

Accordingly, Acheson reacted in the way he thought best. That reaction was to form NATO in Europe and then to continue to place American forces in places around the world which were believed to be of strategic value to the national security of the United States. From these positions of strength, placed strategically around the periphery of the Communist Empire, the United States, Acheson believed, was in the best possible position to monitor and then to react, if necessary,

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[108]Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 45.

[109]Ibid., p. 17.

to any Communist acts of aggression. Acheson did not see power as an end in itself, but rather saw it as a means to an end. He realized that limitations on American power existed once the Soviets had developed their own nuclear capability. The new acid test of foreign relations became not how well or how often the United States used its power against its opponents, but how well it could keep from having to use outright military power in achieving certain goals. The risks of precipitating a nuclear war because of a careless brandishment of power were too great. So while power, military and otherwise, was just as important as ever in the execution of foreign policy, it was reserved for use in a purely defensive or deterrent posture. The result was that the full force of American power would only be brought to bear against an opponent if the wall that was supposed to contain it was breached. As might be expected, there were those who saw this as a basically negative policy which made the United States vulnerable in that it would have to react to any open aggression by the Communist powers at a time and a place of their choosing, thereby limiting the options and the time to react of the United States. One of these critics was none other than John Foster Dulles.

In the presidential campaign of 1952, Dulles penned the Party platform on foreign policy and declared that a Republican victory would

> . . . mark the end of the [Democrat's] negative, futile and immoral policy of "containment" which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism, which in turn enables the rulers

to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction. . . .[110]

After taking office as Secretary of State, Dulles attempted to substitute a Republican policy of "liberation" for what he denounced as the immoral concept of "containment." What he proposed was to exert intense, unrelenting political, economic, and moral pressure on the Communist Empire from outside its borders, and to activate the same barrage of pressures from within its confines. Dulles agreed with the basic policy of building an American wall of power around the periphery of the Communist Empire as Acheson had done, but he felt it should be carried one step further. Rather than just sitting and waiting for the Communists to take the initiative, militarily or otherwise, he felt the United States should take the initiative and engage in squeezing or constricting what might be called the head band of democracy around the head of Communism. Dulles honestly felt that because of the godless and morally bankrupt premises of Communist ideology it would eventually come tumbling down from within. All the United States and its allies had to do was apply and maintain intense pressure from without and the destructive process of Communism would be expedited, and in the end those societies which had been subjugated by the Communists after World War II would become free and democratic and join with the other free societies of the world. It is for this reason that Dulles spent so much of his time trying to promote and

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[110]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 71.

organize the many "collective security" treaties that he did. He did not merely try to gain access to areas where American bases could be placed for the purpose of national security as had Acheson, but tried to recruit other free nations to help bring pressure to bear on what he perceived as the communist menace. In this way he felt he was creating a dynamic and positive response to communism rather than a static and negative "containment."

Along with this "positive" response was another aspect of his overall foreign policy which was called the concept of "massive retaliation." He stated the concept as follows:

> So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare--and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition--then we needed to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, by land and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.
>
> But before military planning could be changed, the President and his advisors, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions. This had been done. The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is <u>our</u> policy; instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices.[111]

As with the concept of "liberation," the concept of "massive retaliation" in response to any communist aggression runs counter to the basic foreign policy of Acheson. Dulles, in contrast to Acheson, felt that if the United States developed a policy which showed not only its

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[111] Ibid., pp. 107-08.

capability but its willingness to use nuclear weapons at a time and place of its choosing, it would not have to rely on reacting to the thrusts of the communists. He also felt that Acheson's policy of trying not to antagonize the communists when it came to the use of nuclear weapons was too cautious an approach to take. Of course, it is very doubtful that a nuclear response by the United States would have taken place to anything but a first strike nuclear attack by the Russians. But Dulles, bluffing perhaps, used it as a ploy in order to try to keep the communists from making any bold moves while the United States continued to try to encircle and eventually alleviate the communist peril. Some may see this type of policy as unrealistic. Be that as it may, it can be legitimately attributed to the Dulles style of diplomacy.

Dulles took it upon himself to be the spiritual and moral leader of the Western powers. Many times he sermonized on how amoral nations, like immoral men, must eventually succumb to defeat for their misdeeds. Like a turn-of-the-century fire and brimstone evangelist, he would rail against the communists for not seeing the evil of their ways which would lead them to certain catastrophe. He projected himself as the protector and benefactor of the democratic nations of the world while being the vengeful disciplinarian whose wrath could be awesome if provoked by the actions of the unruly and amoral communist countries of the world. There could be no compromise. That was Dulles' trademark. An unwavering and uncompromising air of self-righteousness pervaded his policies which, in the final analysis,

caused his policies to become inflexible and stale. For Dulles, the inflexibility was part of the grand design to wear down the communist's attempts at gaining concessions. But it has been twenty years since Dulles was Secretary of State and even today the Communist Empire shows no signs of falling apart as Dulles thought it would. The Secretary of State is confronted with an adversary who, instead of weakening and falling apart, has grown in numbers and strength. This is the situation which now confronts Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger has realized the futility of pursuing a policy like that which was designed by Dulles. He states: "Given the power of modern weapons, it should be the task of our strategic doctrine to create alternatives less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear holocaust. . . ."[112] Kissinger feels that a policy such as that formulated by Dulles is not only naive but dangerous in light of the development of nuclear weapons. He feels that a strategic doctrine has to be developed which brings military power into some sort of balance with American willingness to use that power. To Kissinger, this means the adoption of a doctrine of detente. In speaking about the role of power in such a doctrine he has stated:

> All foreign policy begins with security. No great nation can afford to entrust its destiny to the whim of others. Any stable international system therefore requires a certain equilibrium of power. Our security and that of our allies rest ultimately on deterrence of possible challenges, on ensuring that others have no choice but to exercise restraint.

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[112]Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), p. 69.

> But the more profound challenge is to anchor stability not in the negative restraint of deterrence but in the positive reconciliation of interests. The values and intangibles that motivate men and nations have profound weight in the international balance. A stable peace requires a shared stake in its preservation; it must be considered just.
>
> Power without purpose is sterile; strength without direction leads to incoherence and inconsistency. To achieve peace and progress we must understand the contemporary historical trends and have a design of our own to shape them. The achievement of peace requires a vision of peace.
>
> And this vision must be broadly based. Our people must understand the full complexity of our task; why we must maintain alliances even while striving to ease tensions with adversaries; why we need a design for cooperation between the rich and poor nations even while many developing countries engage in the rhetoric and often the practice of confrontation. It must have scope to include both the new problems of interdependence and the persistent traditional issues of politics and security.[113]

Accordingly, then, leaders in the United States will have to understand that absolute victory and absolute security are no longer real possibilities; the public, in turn, will have to be educated to stop insisting on such outcomes. In Kissinger's opinion, Acheson and Dulles had overlooked this optimum strategy. He does not mean that the United States should give up or soften its massive retaliatory capabilities, but rather means that the United States can and should develop a defense posture that is relevant to its dangers, comprehensible to its friends, credible to its adversaries, and that it is prepared to sustain over the long term. In the final analysis, then, Kissinger, like Acheson and Dulles, feels that power is a crucial

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[113]Henry A. Kissinger, "Foreign Policy and National Security, Secretary of State" [address given before the World Affairs Council and Southern Methodist University, March 22, 1976, pp. 3-4]. [Press Release.]

element in carrying out foreign policy. However, he feels that the ultimate aims and purposes of power have to change with the corresponding changes which have taken place in the highly destructive age of nuclear weapons. The danger of a nuclear confrontation is just too great to base a foreign policy solely on an all-out nuclear response to aggressive actions taken by a hostile nation or, on rigid and inflexible containment policies. Such a policy soon begins to lack credibility and over an extended period of time, leads to a negative and stale foreign policy. Dulles saw this happening in Acheson's policy of "containment" but, like Acheson, he fell prey to the same flaw in his policy of "liberation" and "massive retaliation." Whether Kissinger's theories on the use of power will prove more successful only time will tell, although if the settlement of the Vietnam War and the easing of United States--Soviet and United States--Chinese relations are any indication of things to come, his theories must be given some degree of credit.

The Communist threat

In considering the perceptions of the Communist threat held by Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger, a useful analysis can probably be given by using a survey completed by William Welch in his book American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1970). His findings indicate three distinct image types which correspond very closely with those of Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger.

The first type, which represents Acheson's image, is called

the image of Egotism Limited. Such an image sees the Soviet Union as significantly changing and changeable. An appropriate zoological analogue is a tiger who, with the onset of maturity, kills less frequently, and whose peaceable and good-tempered moments last longer than the ferocious ones, and who may, therefore, be said to be mellowing. The prescription for the appropriate American response as perceived by Acheson, is then called a Hard response. For the partisans of the Hard, the appropriate response is firmness, but tempered and defensive firmness--containment that teaches the tiger limits to what it can do, and by slow pressure seeks to transform it into a pussycat, and to do it all without needlessly provoking it.

The second type, which approximates Dulles' image in some ways, is called the image of Absolute Egotism. Such an image sees the Soviet Union as undifferentiating and unchanging. This type in its utter ferocity, far exceeds the Imperialist type, and even Hobbesian man with his insatiable lust for power. Indeed, it knows no recognizable equivalent in the descriptive literature of human or animal conduct. This only approximates Dulles' image because, although he was probably the most adamant Cold Warrior of these three men, he did believe that the Russian threat could be dealt with and, in the end, overcome. The prescription for the appropriate American response as perceived through this image is then called an Ultra-Hard response. For partisans of the Ultra-Hard, the appropriate response is to gird for inevitable Armageddon, to carry the ball across midfield into enemy territory, to adopt and use to the hilt enemy political warfare

and similar unconventional methods, and to do all this in the firm conviction that the only chance of avoiding slavery or nuclear holocaust is to stand manfully up to the Beast, determined to do or die. Again, although Dulles was renowned for being warlike and having labels like "brinksmanship" applied to his policy, his response probably comes closer to being that of a Hard response in actuality.

The third type which represents or approximates Kissinger's image is called the image of Egotism Intermittent and Defensive. Such an image sees the Soviet Union as changing and changeable. This type stands closer to the status quo type. Naturalists record that a bear of an off-shade color who is rejected by others of his kind becomes neurotic and may with little provocation, commit aggression, even though he is of a species capable of becoming amiable and pacific. Those holding this image of Soviet conduct may be said to conceive of the U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) as a sort of neurotic bear. This approximates Kissinger's view, although he probably sees the Soviet Union as a neurotic bear in the context of a "revolutionary" power turned "legitimate." That is to say, the Soviets, through a policy of detente, seem to have realized limits to their power and to their objective of total communist domination of the world and finally decided to work within the existing international system for the settlement of international conflicts. The prescription for the appropriate American response is then called a Mixed View response. For partisans of the Mixed View, the appropriate response is cooperative firmness, with emphasis on the former,

designed to allay the bear's fears by showing acceptance of it as a member of the human family and gradually to elicit positive cooperation from it. Again, this is an approximation of Kissinger's view with a big difference being that the policy of detente, as it has been advanced by Kissinger, does not emphasize cooperation at the expense of firmness in dealing with the Communists. As with Acheson and Dulles, Kissinger's response in actuality, probably comes closest to the Hard response.

The balance of power, collective security, and world government

Before discussing these three elements of international relations and how they have been perceived by Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger, it is beneficial first to define each element as it applies to this analysis. There are many meanings of the term "balance of power." Haas has this to say,

> One of the more common is a mere factual description of the distribution of political power in the international scene at any one time. But, in another sense, the term is used to mean a theoretical principle acting as a guide to foreign policy-making in any and all international situations, so that the preponderance of any one state may be avoided. Expanding this notion, and assuming that almost all states guide their policies by this principle, a general system of the balance of power is thought to come about, a system in which each participating state has a certain role. Such a system may take the form of two or more power blocs in mutual opposition to each other and it may exist with or without the benefit of a balancer, i.e., a state willing and able to throw its weight on either scale of the balance, and thus presumably bring about the diplomatic or military victory of the bloc so supported, or possibly prevent a change in existing conditions. These are just a few of the various shades of theoretical meaning implying some sort of system. The term "balance of power" has more recently and more frequently been used to describe the existence of a political equilibrium, i.e., such a distribution of power that each state (or major state) is the approximate equal of every other.

For the purposes of this study this is the definition which will be referred to.[114]

Haas also gives us this definition of Collective Security:

> Collective Security is an agreement which obligates its members to abstain from recourse to violence against one another and to participate collectively in suppressing the unlawful use of force by any member. It may also obligate its members to resist aggression by a nonmember against any of them, but what distinguishes it from a mere collective defense agreement is that it presupposes a general interest on the part of all its members in opposing aggression by any of them and entails procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes among its members. This is distinguished from a defensive alliance which presupposes only a common interest in opposing threats from specific states or groups of states outside the alliance and does not necessarily or usually entail provisions for settling disputes among its members. It is also distinguished from an offensive alliance which aims at forcibly changing the international status quo, territorially or otherwise, to increase the assets of its members.[115]

"World Government" has been suggested on several different levels, but for this analysis, since it deals with American policy, it is important to mention only the appraisal, as Claude argues, of the American experience:

> Such an appraisal, as might be expected, concentrates attention upon the federal type of governmental system, with the suggestion that the success of small-scale federalism would be duplicated if it were applied on a larger scale. This is distinguished from an international or world organization, such as the U.N. [United Nations] which functions more or less as a forum for international debate and decision-making without the sanctions and powers which would give it the status of a World

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[114] Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda," Politics and the International System, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), pp. 452-53.

[115] Ibid., 481-82.

Government in the truest sense of the word.[116]

In discussing these elements as each man perceived them it should first be noted that each man, in his own way, has believed in and utilized each element to some degree. Of course, the degree has varied from element to element and man to man. Acheson was keenly aware of the concept of the "balance of power" and the large part it had to play in the making of foreign policy. But he was also keenly aware of the profound changes which had taken place in the world after World War II and knew that this meant modifications in the role of the traditional concept of the "balance of power." Such changes included the loss of Great Britain as the balancer of the system which it had been throughout most of the eighteenth, nineteenth and part of the twentieth century. Then there was a settling or solidification of alliance systems which saw the Russians sponsoring the Warsaw Pact poised diametrically opposite the United States sponsoring the NATO alliance system. The emergence of this bipolar world, which marked the onset of the Cold War, meant that the alliance of convenience and the great shifts in the alliance systems of the past were gone. In the bipolar world, once a policy for an alliance system was developed it was expected that each member would conform to the consensus of the whole. Additionally, there was the beginning of what

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[116]Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Appraisal of the Case for World Government," Politics and the International System, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), p. 592.

has been coined as the "balance of terror." With the possession of nuclear weapons by both alliance systems, the balance had shifted from one of power to one of terror because of the almost limitless destruction of nuclear weapons. In spite of these major developments, however, Acheson believed that the nation-state would continue to be the principle actor in the international environment, that the first duty of any nation-state is to survive, that the system is constantly changing, that peace is piecemeal and comes only through an intelligent and realistic approach to international politics, and last, there are no final solutions or panaceas which can all at once eliminate the many and varied problems confronting the international system. It is for these reasons that the "balance of power" came to be the principle element in the Acheson style of diplomacy. Of course, this fact came to have profound implications for the other concepts of "collective security" and "world government."

In discussing the concept of "collective security" it should here be understood that there is no such thing in the strictest sense of the definition which was given to begin this discussion. "Collective security" is one of those abstract terms like "infinity" which can be approached but never really reached. What this means is that although Acheson may have been trying to provide a "collective security" framework through his policies, he could only approximate such a concept. There are two reasons which are primarily responsible for this fact. First of all, although Acheson realized the importance of NATO and other treaty agreements in countering the communist's

efforts at absolute security, the writer does not think that at this early time in the Cold War Acheson was trying to, or even could, develop a collective security agreement in the strictest sense of the word. That is to say, in NATO he was trying to form a defensive alliance as his first priority in opposing what he perceived as the Soviet threat. Second, because of the bitter feelings remaining after the war, the defense of Europe was the single most crucial element around which the alliance had to be built. It was only after the alliance had endured for a period of time that the nations of NATO might move toward a "collective security" agreement through which difficulties between the members could be worked out. In the meantime, the United Nations and other international institutions had to be relied upon to help in the settlement of international disputes of nations both friendly and hostile.

Notice that the United Nations is referred to as an international organization and not as a "world government." As has already been illustrated, Acheson did not believe in a "world government" as the solution to solving problems in the international environment. But he did see a place for international organizations, such as the U.N., for helping to solve international disputes. This belief was borne out most graphically when North Korea invaded South Korea in June of 1950. The first action Acheson recommended to President Truman was to submit a formal protest to the U.N. Security Council. The purpose in doing so was threefold. First, there was always the chance that if the vote of the Security Council deemed the invasion

illegal it might have been able to persuade the North Koreans to stop any subsequent action. Second, with Russia temporarily absent from the Security Council, the U.S. could secure U.N. approval for its decision to intervene in Korea. Third, he calculated that by going to the U.N. while concurrently taking unilateral action, the U.S. might gain not only material, but more importantly, moral support from the majority of the other nations in the U.N. Such a move would benefit the United States tremendously while tending to discredit the communists in the eyes of the world as blatent and aggressive expansionists. In the final analysis, however, the U.N. and organizations like it, were seen by Acheson as just another means to an end, not as genuine "collective security" systems, and certainly not as "world government." If he thought it would benefit the United States to submit an issue to the U.N. he would. If not, then the U.N. was passed over in favor of another type of action. For Acheson knew, as did the Russians, that, whether the members of the U.N. agreed or disagreed with the American position on some issue, they had no sanctions to prevent the United States from taking any action it deemed necessary under the circumstances. It was probably because of this inherent lack of authority on the part of the U.N. that he felt neither the U.N., nor any other type of international organization, would ever evolve into any type of a "world government" that could play a really decisive role in the international affairs of the future.

Dulles, as in so many other aspects of foreign policy, seems to be a paradox when considering these three elements. As far as

the concept of the "balance of power" is concerned, Dulles was obviously aware of it, having been in and around international relations for over forty years, but he never really subscribed to it as an ultimate solution to the problems of stabilizing the international environment. Perhaps it was because, as a legal counsel at the Paris Peace Conference, he was able to witness the tragic end of an era which had been so dominated by a "balance of power." Dulles was a paradox for, as has been illustrated in a previous chapter, Dulles was a firm believer in some sort of international organization as the ultimate answer to international disputes and, he was, of course, as an American delegate in San Francisco, California, a prime moving force behind the establishment of the United Nations. But, faced with the realities of working in the international environment of the Cold War, he, like Acheson before him, found it much more productive and expedient to work through and for stronger and more numerous "collective defense" agreements rather than through the U.N., which was less an agency for collective security than an arena for the Cold War. The evidence exists in the number of formal agreements which are personally attributable to him. Some of these were SEATO in Asia; CENTO in Central Europe and the Middle East; ANZUS for Australia, New Zealand and the United States; and the OAS for the nations of Central and Latin America. But, whereas Acheson conceived of the NATO alliance as essentially a defensive alliance, Dulles conceived of these agreements as essentially offensive alliances which were aimed at changing the international status quo. Again, these

were not "collective security" agreements in the strict sense of the term, but were rather a means to fulfill his overall policy of "liberation" and "rollback" which would see the Communist Empire fall away under the pressures these alliances and other factors brought to bear. In the meantime, Dulles was a strong advocate of the United Nations and organizations like it. He, probably more than any other Secretary of State, advocated the development of more and stronger international institutions like the U.N., and between the crucial years of 1940 and 1945, he worked hard through organizations like the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace to make them a reality. At the same time, he probably did more for the strengthening and proliferation of what is termed "offensive alliance agreements" than any Secretary before or since. He hoped that international organizations would play a decisive role in international affairs but in the every day workings of the foreign policy-making process it was the element of "collective defense," or more precisely offensive alliances, that predominated in his foreign policy objectives.

Kissinger, like Acheson, is highly aware of the concept of the "balance of power" and makes frequent references to it in his writings. However, like Acheson, he realizes and acknowledges that the system as it existed in the nineteenth century, differs substantially from any "balance of power" system which exists today. He states the essence of the dilemma in a statement which says:

> The traditional criteria for the balance of power were territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only by conquest; hence, as long as territorial expansion was foreclosed,

> or severely limited, the equilibrium was likely to be preserved. In the contemporary period, this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power are possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state. China gained more in real military power through the acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia. In other words, the really fundamental changes in the balance of power have all occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an urgent need to analyze just what is understood by power--as well as by balance of power--in the nuclear age.[117]

In describing how the Nixon Administration interpreted this new "balance of power" situation he has said that, to the extent that the balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly into an advantage over one's opponent. But today it seems evident that the Soviet Union, like the United States, has begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength. The result of this interpretation was that the President, with the help of Kissinger, mapped new directions for American foreign policy. There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain

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[117]Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), pp. 60-61.

marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches. It was, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. However, this set of circumstances was not only to be created for the Soviets. For when one talks of equilibrium he does not mean a simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time. In an age of ideological schism the distinction between friends and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals as well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength of our friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

In discussing the importance of alliances in his conception of the international environment, Kissinger has stated:

> The cornerstone of our foreign policy is--as it has been for a generation--our partnership with our principal allies in the Atlantic community and Japan. . . . Our cooperation with the great industrial democracies has been the underpinning of the world economic system, which has sustained global prosperity and spread it to the far corners of the earth.
>
> . . . And in the last few years we and our allies have not only continued to strengthen our common defenses, we have extended our collaboration successfully into new dimensions of common endeavor--in improved political consultation, in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the Communist countries, in developing a common energy policy and strategy, in reinforcing our respective economic policies for recovery from recession, in environmental cooperation, and in fashioning common approaches for the dialogue with the developing countries.
>
> Our ties with the great democracies are thus not an alliance of convenience but a union of principle in defense of democratic

> values and our way of life. It is our ideals that inspire not only our self-defense but all else we do.[118]

In the final analysis, Kissinger believes that there may be as many as five-, six-, or even seven-major centers of power with China, Russia, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe being at least the principle ones. This is not to say that others are excluded but only a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new centers of power has meant greater freedom of action in this setting, the immediate American aim has been to build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of sparing mankind the scourges of war. An interdependent world community cannot tolerate either big power confrontations or recurrent regional crises. Kissinger has stressed, though, that peace must be more than the absence of conflict. He has stated,

> We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human aspirations, not an end in itself. We have learned much about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots. We have begun to accommodate our differences, but we have not affirmed our commonality. We may have improved the mastery of equilibrium, but we have not yet attained justice.[119]

And so it is with the "balance of power," albeit a very new and different system from that which existed in the nineteenth century, that

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[118] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy, Secretary of State" [testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Bicentennial hearings on "Foreign Policy Choices for the '70s and '80s," March 16, 1976, p. 4]. [Press Release.]

[119] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Challenge of Peace, Secretary of State [address given before the St. Louis World Affairs Council, St. Louis, Missouri, May 12, 1975, p. 4]. [Press Release.]

Kissinger believes is the crucial element in bringing about an easing of the international tensions which have plagued the world so long.

Because of Kissinger's commitment to the concept of the "balance of power," the implications for "collective defense" alliances and "world organizations" is farreaching. With respect to the former concept of alliances, it is only secondary to that of the "balance of power" in that it is probably the primary or crucial component of that larger concept. Once again, he has stated:

> Our alliances were formed when the world was divided into two blocs and the United States was preponderant in the West; today we must harmonize the policies of strong independent states under conditions of eased international tensions. Our alliances represented initially a response to a military threat; today, we must base our unity on shared efforts across a broad range of human activity. A whole spectrum of challenges calls the industrialized nations to joint action; the need for an equitable and stable world trading and monetary system; the imperative for cooperation in energy development and conservation and in dealing with the energy producers. We are beckoned by the entire agenda of interdependence in food, in raw materials, and in giving meaning and significance to life in modern industrialized societies.[120]

Like the element of the "balance of power," the element of "collective defense" has undergone significant changes over the thirty years of the Cold War. According to Kissinger, it will have to continue to change along with the international environment that spawned it if it is to continue to be a viable and useful tool for the statesman of the future. More important than that, the element of alliances more generally, is the dependent variable in the equation of international equilibrium as Kissinger perceives it. So that if it breaks down it

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[120]Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 267.

will be the first step in the breakdown of the entire system.

In discussing Kissinger's views on "world government" it is obvious from his strong convictions about the "balance of power" and the largely independent role the United States plays in it, that he in no way sees a "world government" as a real possibility for solving the problems of the international environment. This is not to say that he does not support the formation of international organizations for concentrating on and solving specific problems. An illustration of his belief in various international organizations is given in a statement he made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Bicentennial hearings on "Foreign Policy Choices for the '70s and '80s" on March 16, 1976. He stated at that time:

> In the coming decade the collaboration of the industrial democracies can be the dynamic force in the building of a more secure and progressive international order. . . . In this regard I want to mention an important item of business before this committee--approval of our participation in the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) Financial Support Fund. This is the contingency mechanism, proposed by the United States, to insure mutual support among the industrialized nations in the face of financial disruptions or pressures by actions of the oil cartel. At little cost this mechanism will provide a financial safety net, combat protectionism, and promote our cooperation on energy policy. . . .
>
> The new solidarity we are building can draw its inspiration from our hopes and ideals rather than merely from our common dangers. A thriving Europe and Japan and North America will not only be secure and prosperous but a magnet to the Communist countries and to the developing world.[121]

It can be seen that the type of international organization Kissinger

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[121]Kissinger, "The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy, Secretary of State," pp. 2-3.

is speaking about is one which starts out with a very select group of countries which all have a certain problem in common. By concentrating on a single problem and only involving those countries which are known to cooperate in such endeavors, the probability of having dissension among the members is decreased significantly and the important work that must be done can get done without interruptions from within. As he stated in the last paragraph of the statement mentioned previously, hopefully, after the organization has functioned successfully over a period of time, it will become attractive to those of the Communist bloc so that they will join and in the end there will emerge a truly international organization.

The role of morality

The element of morality as perceived by Acheson and Kissinger is much the same but Dulles, probably because of his religious convictions, differs perceptibly from his counterparts. From their writings it is easy to see that Acheson and Kissinger reject the absolutist ethical approach--by which is meant one which attempts to apply the maxim or ideology of moral teaching for individuals to relations among states--as a legitimate guideline for conducting affairs in the complex international sphere. Morality in domestic affairs is an entirely different concept from any attempt at constructing an international moral system. Man simply cannot transpose moral parameters from the domestic to the international system. Acheson elaborated this feeling when he stated:

> Morality is a very slippery word in international

> affairs. . . .
>
> Morality in domestic affairs is something one can understand because there one is living under a system which has enforcement agencies and agencies for formulating doctrines and enforcing doctrines. In the world, it may be that that does not exist. . . .
>
> You are dealing with people, one half of whom deny the very foundations of what you call morality. . . .[122]

Kissinger echoes much the same feeling when he states:

> Any statesman faces the problem of relating morality to what is possible. As long as the United States was absolutely secure, behind two great oceans, it could afford the luxury of moral pronouncements divorced from the reality of the world in which other countries have to make decisions, or to make an important part of the decisions, which determine whether you can implement them.
>
> A purely pragmatic policy is unsuited to the American character, and in any event leads to paralysis. An excessively moralistic policy would be totally devoid of contacts with reality and would lead to empty posturing.
>
> In foreign policy, you always face difficult choices. And you always face the problem that, when you make your decision, you do not know the outcome. So your moral convictions are necessary to give you the strength to make the difficult choices when you have no assurance of success.[123]

What Acheson and Kissinger were ultimately saying was that states were not mollified by other states' choosing to regard them as other than they really were. State interests were intimately linked to their power, and power was a complex compound, consisting, of course, of military capability and economic resources, but depending ultimately on one other crucial element--the quality of the political

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[122] Ronald J. Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson (Miami, Florida: Miami University; Odyssey Press, 1969), p. 52.

[123] Interview with Henry A. Kissinger for "Bill Moyer's Journal: International Report, Secretary of State," January 16, 1975, [Press Release.]

leadership. Kissinger's nineteenth-century studies led him to emphasize four absolutely essential components of state power: prevailing political and strategic perceptions; internal support for specific policies; relations with other states--allied, neutral, or enemy--and the character of the leadership and its capacity to achieve the objectives that it decided upon. The state, unlike the individual, could not be said to have a natural life span. The question of its life or death was a function always of specific decisions taken; there was no way to prove that a specific risk averted would have compromised the life of the state.[124]

Dulles, on the other hand, with his penchant for applying simplistic labels to the various aspects of his foreign policy, engaged the United States in a crusade against the morally corrupt peoples of the Communist Empire. He believed in the inevitable triumph of the morally upstanding and God-fearing Western world over the Godless premise of Communist ideology. Like an avenging angel, Dulles perceived the United States as the last real bastion of incorruptibility and it was up to him, as Secretary of State, to spread the word of doom for Communism and the word of triumph for democracy. As was previously mentioned, this devotion to morality led to a certain degree of inflexibility in Dulles' responses to various Communist actions. For no matter what the Communists did, whether the action was hostile or friendly, Dulles perceived it as potentially

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[124]Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), pp. 11-12.

detrimental to the United States and the free world and, therefore, would settle for nothing less than the elimination of all Communist threats through his policies of "rollback" and "liberation" for those countries which were formerly free of Communist domination.

The character of the international system

In considering the general character of the international system, that is, the general impression of the system as perceived by Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger, it can be said that the impressions have been, for the most part, alike. For instance, each has seen the world as being in a constant state of flux in which change is a natural and predictable result. The problem, each has realized, is how to allow for such change without precipitating a war which might end society as we know it. Each, through his writing, agrees that it is revolutionary powers, like the Russians, which, through the years, have upset the stability of the system by trying to expand and gain hegemony over that system. Last, Acheson and Kissinger have acknowledged that there are not ultimate solutions to the many and constantly changing problems which confront the system. There are no panaceas for international affairs. Solutions, according to them, only come from a concentrated and determined effort by the nations of the system--through hard work, intelligent diplomacy, and the willingness to negotiate on those issues crucial to the maintenance of a stable international system. In other words, Acheson and Kissinger were realists when it came to dealing in foreign affairs. Dulles, while

he was probably one of the hardest working secretaries, let his religious convictions get in the way of carrying out what might be called a realistic policy. His expressed hopes for a viable "world government" and his many overly optimistic predictions for his policies of "rollback" and "liberation," tended to outrage people both home and abroad. Of course, what has been said thus far is in the realm of generalizations and an analysis of each man at the time he has served as Secretary of State shows each differing substantially on how he perceived various elements of the system at that time.

Acheson became Secretary shortly after the Soviet Union in particular, and Communism in general, began probing operations in various parts of Europe and Asia. The year was 1947 and Communism was on the move in Turkey and Greece. The American response, largely determined by Acheson himself, was the Truman Doctrine which asked Congress for 400 million dollars to join in a global commitment against Communism. In the same year that Acheson took over as Secretary the Russians decided to blockade Berlin and try to force the British, French and United States' occupation forces out. Again the United States responded. This time it was the Berlin Airlift which kept the Communists from completely taking over the city. In 1949 the Chinese Communists finally took control of mainland China and the Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, were forced to flee to the island of Formosa. Last, in 1950, there was the attack by North Korea on South Korea. Acheson must have felt like the Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, for every hole he plugged another one was soon

to appear. Acheson's solution to this problem was the policy of "containment," whereby he hoped to dam up the impending flood of Communism seemingly trying to spill over into the rest of the world. At the center of such a policy was the necessity of remaining strong, militarily and otherwise, and refusing to allow the Communists to gain a foothold in any countries outside of their existing sphere of influence. The policy of "containment" was basically defensive because Acheson did not want to antagonize the Communists by poising great numbers of American forces around the periphery of the Communist Empire. At the same time, however, he wanted them to know that such forces as were deployed would be utilized if provoked by actions seen as hostile to the United States. Acheson believed that if the United States maintained a strong posture, militarily, economically, and otherwise, ready to oppose any and all aggressive actions by the Communists, then over a period of time the Communists would resign themselves to the fact that they could make no further gains outside of their existing territorial sphere of influence. After they realized this then, hopefully, meaningful negotiations could begin between the two on the crucial issues of the nuclear age. Dulles, however, did not see the solution to the problem in the same way.

Dulles, as has been illustrated, saw Acheson's policy of "containment" as being negative and unproductive in bringing solutions to the problems of foreign policy. Dulles saw the Communist danger not as one which the United States and the free world should have to learn to live with, but rather as one which had to be eliminated if at

all possible. He believed that the system could not sustain two ideologies of such diversity and that, in the end, one would have to overcome the other. If John Foster Dulles had anything to say about it, capitalism and democracy was going to triumph. His strategy for accomplishing this triumph was to move from the defensive posture of Acheson's "containment" to the offensive posture provided for in his twin policies of "liberation" and "massive retaliation." Dulles believed that the Christian-democratic nations of the world were morally and ethically superior to the atheistic-Communist nations of the world. It was this moral superiority, along with a strong and positive foreign policy, which, in the end, would lead to the triumph of the democratic nations over the Communist nations. All the United States had to do was to expand the number of its "collective defense" agreements, which to him were offensive alliances, and threaten "massive retaliation" for any aggressive actions taken by the Communists anywhere in the world. Under such pressure, he believed, the Communists would not only give up trying to expand their empire, but also give up trying to hold those nations which were once free and democratic themselves. In this way he would have been fulfilling his policies of "rollback" and "liberation."

In Kissinger's view, the perceptions of Acheson and Dulles on the character of the international system, at the time each served as Secretary, were lacking in flexibility. Given the stimulus at the time, it may seem that the responses of these men were natural and necessary. But Kissinger feels that the policies of "containment" and

"liberation" soon led to a rigidity or inflexibility and a maintenance of the status quo which, in the nuclear age, is extremely dangerous. To Kissinger, such rigidity in policy-making automatically limits the options of the United States while increasing those of the Russians. His reasoning is that for any action, the Soviets know that they can expect a certain response if America's policy is too rigid. This allows them to plan the ways and means of circumventing U.S. policy to achieve their own ends. For example, instead of engaging in overt military action in an area, Russia will engage in covert operations which leaves the U.S. under a policy advocating "massive retaliation," such as Dulles advocated, impotent and unable to react. Massive retaliation is simply an excessive response to covert, ambiguous forms of Soviet aggression such as subversion. For Kissinger, the policy of detente and an easing of the tensions of the Cold War, which have peaked several times in the last thirty years, is the answer in stabilizing the international environment in the years to come.

Kissinger's evaluation of the international environment as Secretary of State has led him to make the following statements concerning how best to bring a semblance of stability and order to the environment for future generations:

> First, we face the necessity of drawing on the new strength and vitality of our allies and friends to intensify our partnership with them. And today our unity with the great industrial democracies is fundamental to all we seek to accomplish in the world. It is we who maintain the global balance of power that keeps the peace. . . . In a complex world--of equilibrium and coexistence, of competition and interdependence--it is our ideals that give meaning and purpose to our endeavors.
>
> For we face, secondly, the age-old challenge of maintaining

> peace but in the unprecedented dimension of an age of thermo-nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, after sixty years of economic and industrial growth, has--inevitably--reached the status of a superpower. As a result we must conduct a dual policy. We and our allies must restrain Soviet power and prevent its use to upset global stability. At the same time our generation faces the long-term challenge of putting the U.S.--Soviet relationship on a more secure, constructive, and durable basis. . . .
>
> . . . There is the continuing need to moderate and resolve regional conflicts which threaten global economic or political stability. And there is the urgent and growing challenge of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, which gravely increases the risks of nuclear holocaust.
>
> The third central challenge is to build a wider community out of the turbulent environment of today's nearly 150 independent nations. For the first time in history the international community has become truly global. . . . A new pattern of relationships must be fashioned out of cooperation for mutual benefit, impelled by the reality of our global interdependence.
>
> Our friendships with nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa--on the basis of mutual respect and practical cooperation--take on a new importance as the building blocks of world community. We must recognize that no world order will be stable over the last quarter of this century unless all its participants consider that they have a stake in it and that it is legitimate and just.[125]

According to Kissinger, these are the basic challenges facing this nation as it enters its third century.

Perceptions: Creative or distorted

In considering this last element it is felt that, regardless of whether the policies of these men are considered successful or not, each man has been creative to some degree in formulating United States policy in a way and style unique to himself. Creativity is a very elusive concept to define. Trying to define creativity is like looking at half a glass of water and trying to determine if the glass is half

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[125]Kissinger, "The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy, Secretary of State," pp. 4-5.

full or half empty. There are other factors which are not known but which must be known if an absolute determination is to be made. So it is with trying to decide the creativity or distortion of a foreign policy. The fact is that each of these men has served at a distinct time in a constantly changing world. In many of the situations in the world, the stimuli encountered by one of them was unique to his circumstances. Ultimately, however, the final determination of a response is dictated by how the various stimuli are perceived by each man. Witness, for example, the variations in the five common elements or stimuli discussed in this chapter.

It seems obvious to say, because of the change he made in policy, that Dulles probably thought Acheson's policy of "containment" was naive. The same might be said about Kissinger in relation to both Acheson and Dulles. But were they distorted? It is impossible to be sure, for who is to say that if Acheson or Dulles had responded with a policy of detente events would have been different or better for the United States? The only certain thing is that each man has brought his own indelible mark and style to the office of Secretary of State and, while there, has contributed to the general creative process which is foreign policy. Acheson came to the Secretaryship at the beginning of a totally new era in foreign relations. He, along with men like Marshall, had to help create and build some sort of policy for this new era. The fact that he had no past cases or records in dealing with the new bipolar and nuclear age which had just emerged made his Secretaryship a creative endeavor. Being one of the first

Secretarys in this new era does not necessarily make him the most creative Secretary of State to have ever served, but it does mean that the element of creativity played a large part in his policy-making. And perhaps the most important consideration is what Acheson himself thought of his policy. The following quotations show that Acheson undoubtedly thought American foreign policy under his tutelage, was a creative endeavor. He stated:

> It is a fact of considerable importance, although hardly recognized, that much of what the free world has been doing to build its strength has been in itself a great creative effort. The means by which free people have sought to strengthen their defenses have led, perhaps to some degree unconsciously, to a community sense among free nations.
>
> The great effort in which we are engaged to build a North Atlantic Community is not merely a means. It is in itself a creative act of historic significance. It is often true in history, that men acting under immediate compulsion are only partly aware of the great consequences of what they have set in motion. Measures taken to suit a narrower purpose, if conceived in harmony with man's moral nature, may leave a great creative legacy. . . .
>
> In building a more secure and prosperous world, we must not lose sight of the basic motivation of our effort: the inherent worth of the individual human person. Our aim is to create a world in which each human being shall have the opportunity to fulfill his creative possibilities in harmony with all.[126]

The policies of John Foster Dulles have often been described as "containment plus." In other words, all Dulles did was to carry the basic policy of "containment" to its extremes. But the concepts of "massive retaliation," "liberation," and "rollback" were trademarks of a diplomacy which was unique and creative in design. Many critics

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[126]Bulletin XXIII, June 22, 1950:17 [address before the Harvard Alumni Association, Cambridge, Massachusetts].

have alleged that because of his negativism and uncompromising attitude toward the Communists on many issues he distorted the actual intentions of the Russians to his own preconceived notions of what they intended. It has been said that such an attitude prevented the United States from making gains during conciliatory moods of the Communist leadership. Critics saw these periods as missed opportunities in easing the tension of the Cold War. But the only thing that can be definitely said about Dulles as Secretary of State is that he was a very outspoken representative for American morals, values, and political ideals and was not willing to compromise any of his basic beliefs on these or any issues when it came to dealing with the Communists. Whether this led to missed opportunities in helping ease the tensions of the Cold War is purely speculation. There is no proof that any other policy would have helped ease the world situation. Probably more than trying to create a policy, Dulles tried to create an attitude; a world opinion based on the Christian ethic with the belief that the idea of brotherhood transcends nationality, ideology, and even religion. Because many people did not like or accept or understand his deep devotion to morality in the realm of foreign affairs does not mean that Dulles was not trying to create a better and more peaceful international environment than the one he had inherited.

Kissinger seems to me to be the most creative Secretary of these three men. Perhaps it is because he was a political theorist, and not a lawyer, as were Acheson and Dulles, before entering

government service. Whatever the reason, Kissinger, more than Acheson and Dulles, seems to possess a greater insight into the functioning of foreign relations. From his writings, it appears that he is far more aware of the nuances and details which are otherwise overlooked by most other foreign policy-makers. The gains which have been made by him in the areas of easing tensions between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China, the SALT talks, and other diplomatic advances stand in marked contrast to the intransigence and stalemate which has existed for the better part of the last thirty years. With the beginning of the decade of the 1970s the United States, and indeed the world, has entered a new era of international relations. The emphasis in U.S. foreign policy has shifted from a preponderance of power, as advocated under Acheson and Dulles, to that of an equilibrium of power with moves being made to reduce the nuclear arms race and stabilize the very turbulent international system. Kissinger himself has stated that creativity is essential in today's international environment. He has stated:

> The world stands uneasily poised between unprecedented chaos and the opportunity for unparalleled creativity. The next few years will determine whether interdependence will foster common progress or common disaster. Our generation has the opportunity to shape a new cooperative international system; if we fail to act with vision we will condemn ourselves to mounting domestic and international crises.[127]

Whether he has been creative is, again, impossible to really tell

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[127]Henry A. Kissinger, "A New National Partnership, Secretary of State" [address given in Los Angeles, January 24, 1975, p. 1]. [Press Release.]

accurately but history will certainly be a good indication and it will only be in the light of it that any type of answer can be attempted. For the present it can be said that Kissinger has made bold and innovative moves in running U.S. foreign policy which can be termed creative by virtue of the fact of their deviation from the traditional Cold War policy of the previous thirty years.

Since 1948, the United States has been fortunate to have three forceful and creative Secretarys of State, who have played no small part in keeping United States foreign policy flexible, adaptable, and yet powerful in the face of the increasingly difficult challenges of the Cold War era. The challenges are not only formidable but constantly changing and it will only be through men like Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger--whose intelligence, convictions and fortitude to follow those convictions--that the United States will continue to be a great leader in the world and move forward in helping to solve the many problems confronting the world. Such men will continue to be needed for the future. Kissinger himself has stated the requirements for the future policy-makers of America. He stated that:

> The contemporary dilemma is that there are not total solutions; we live in a world gripped by revolutions in technology, values, and institutions. We are immersed in an unending process, not in a quest for a final destination as has been the misconception of the past. The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physical but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will depend ultimately on the convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power.[128]

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[128]Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 79-80.

Has Kissinger met this challenge through his policy of detente? Has he, in fact, even correctly defined the nature of the problems confronting the contemporary foreign policy-maker? Did Acheson and Dulles correctly interpret the events and personalities of the international environment at the time they served as Secretary of State? Will the future generations be able to provide the men to make foreign policy with the necessary leadership qualities and insights required by a constantly changing world? The answers to these questions are far beyond the scope of this study. However, there is one thing that this study does show with certainty. That is that the future foreign policy-makers of the United States, whoever they are, will make decisions based not so much upon the events and actions of the past, but rather by how they themselves interpret and perceive those elements both before and after entering office. The resulting policy will then be one which is an indelible imprint of the man himself. It is his ultimate identifying mark like his fingerprints of which no other set is exactly alike.

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